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THE ANTI-MESSINESS PRINCIPLE IN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Anita S. Krishnakumar*
Many of the Supreme Court's statutory interpretation opinions reflect a juispru-
dential aversion to interpreting statutes in a manner that will prove "messy "for imple-
menting courts to administer. Yet the practice of construing statutes to avoid
"messiness" has gone largely unnoticed in the statutory interpretation literature. This
Article seeks to illuminate the Court's use of "anti-messiness" arguments to interpret
statutes and to bring theoretical attention to the principle of "messiness" avoidance.
The Article begins by defining the concept of anti-messiness and providing a typology of
common anti-messiness arguments used by the Supreme Court. It then considers some
dangers inherent in the Court's use of anti-messiness arguments to reject otherwise plau-
sible statutory constructions. Last, the Article explores how the anti-messiness principle
fits within existing theories of jurisprudence and statutory interpretation and discusses
how attentiveness to anti-messiness might add greater texture to prominent theories of
statutory interpretation.
INTRODUCTION
In its 2009 term opinion in Hertz Corp. v. Friend,' the Supreme
Court unanimously adopted a presumption that the place where a
corporation maintains its headquarters is its "principal place of busi-
ness"2 under the federal diversity jurisdiction statute.3 In so ruling,
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educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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1 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010).
2 Id. at 1186.
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the Court relied heavily upon "the need for judicial administration of
a jurisdictional statute to remain as simple as possible."4 The Court's
opinion-and, indeed, the Justices' questions at oral argument 5-dis-
played an overt preference for the statutory construction that would
prove simplest to apply. A "headquarters" presumption was best, the
Court argued, because it "points courts in a single direction" so they
"do not have to try to weigh corporate functions, assets, or revenues
different in kind, one from the other."6 Other, more nuanced "prin-
cipal place of business" tests were rejected as "difficult to apply" and
criticized for their "growing complexity."7  In layman's terms, the
Court's primary justification for embracing the "headquarters" test
reduced to the argument that: Other tests are too messy! A presumption
that a corporation's headquarters constitute its "principal place of business" is
the best statutoiy reading because it is (relatively) simple and will keep imple-
menting courts from having to engage in intricate, factually-difficult analyses.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Hertz is intriguing in its own
right, but particularly so because the preference for simplicity that it
expresses is quietly familiar: Upon inspection, it turns out that ajuris-
prudential aversion to messy, complex statutory constructions-or,
more accurately, to constructions that require messy factual determi-
nations by implementing courts-can be found lurking in the back-
ground of several of the Court's statutory interpretation cases. In
other words, when giving content to the words in a statute, the Court
regularly eschews definitions, tests, and applications that require intri-
cate factual assessments and favors interpretations that are relatively
simple to implement.
This "anti-messiness" norm is not limited to the statutory context.
It also shows up, in a slightly different form, in the Court's constitu-
tional jurisprudence and it long has played a role in justifying the
Court's overruling of troublesome precedents, despite stare decisis
concerns. What is interesting about the Court's use of the principle in
3 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
4 Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1186.
5 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, Nov. 10, 2009, Hertz Corp. v. Friend,
130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010) at 7, 11. 8-14 [hereinafter "Tr."] (suggestion by Justice Gins-
burg that when a corporation has "dispersed operations," then "you take the head-
quarters, because there's no way to pick among" other tests and "it certainly isn't
worth the labor to try to do that"); Tr. at 27, 11. 1-4 (comment by Justice Kennedy that
"[n]ot all diversity suits have major law firms in them and a lot of resources to spend
in-in discovery to determine more complex tests"); Tr. at 38, 11. 21-24 (Justice Gins-
burg: "[If it's got to be one place, why not just keep it simple and say presumptively
it's the business headquarters, in a particular case you could show otherwise.").
6 Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1194.
7 Id. at 1191.
ANTI-MESSINESS PRINCIPLE
the statutory context, however, is that (i) the existence of this back-
ground norm has gone surprisingly unnoticed in the literature; and
(ii) all of the debate surrounding specific invocations of the principle
has focused on whether a particular interpretation in fact will prove
messy to implement, not on the validity of the norm itself. Messiness
avoidance seems to be widely accepted as a legitimate basis for
rejecting a statutory construction. Indeed, those who oppose a con-
struction that invokes anti-messiness arguments typically do not chal-
lenge the virtues of messiness avoidance. Instead, they tend to quarrel
with the likelihood that the disfavored interpretation will be difficult,
cumbersome, or untidy to implement. In most of the cases analyzed
below, the opposing opinion, if there was one, responded to anti-
messiness arguments with claims that the interpretation would not, in
fact, result in the predicted messiness.8 In other words, the jurispru-
dential battles tend to take place at the factual, rather than the theo-
retical, level.
At times, an opposing opinion even has argued that the interpre-
tation chosen by the anti-messiness-invoking opinion will itself be
messy to implement.9 That is, the response to a challenge that one
interpretation will prove unduly messy to implement is that the pro-
posed alternative will prove at least as messy to implement as well.
The fact that opposing opinions devote such energy to undermining
anti-messiness-based criticisms of their preferred statutory construc-
tion and even take pains to cast the countervailing construction as
8 For example, in Bartlett v. Strickland, a Voting Rights Act case centering on
whether § 2 requires the creation of districts with the potential for crossover voting by
white voters, much of the debate between the majority and dissenting opinions
revolved around how difficult it would be for courts to evaluate a district's crossover
potential. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1244-45, 1253-54 (2009); see also
Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 8 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the con-
struction rejected by the majority would not prove messy to implement because the
distinction that courts would be required to make was "obvious"); Anza v. Ideal Steel
Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 467-68 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (arguing that the majority "overstate[d] the difficulties of proof"
necessitated by the rejected statutory construction, and that the means through which
the fraud at issue was carried out rendered the damages more ascertainable than the
majority acknowledged).
9 See, e.g., Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1257 ("[E]ven when the 50% threshold is satis-
fied, a court will still have to engage in factually messy enquiries about the 'potential' such a
district may afford, the degree of minority cohesion and majority-bloc voting, and the
existence of vote-dilution under a totality of the circumstances.") (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis added); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2357 (2009) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's construction would itself prove messy
and difficult for lower courts to apply by "complicat[ing] every case in which a plain-
tiff raises both ADEA and Title VII claims").
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equally messy is significant, and suggests that the background norm of
messiness avoidance is deeply entrenched in statutory jurisprudence.
This Article seeks to illuminate the work that anti-messiness argu-
ments perform in the Court's statutory jurisprudence, as well as to
evaluate the dangers and theoretical implications of such arguments.
The Article first aims to identify and organize the Court's articulation
of anti-messiness arguments. Part I defines "anti-messiness" and
describes how the principle is employed in statutory construction. It
then discusses the background concerns that motivate the anti-messi-
ness principle and provides a typology of anti-messiness arguments,
discussing separately arguments based on: judicial inexpertness, prac-
tical difficulty, indeterminacy, and inconsistency. I offer several
detailed examples, drawing on cases involving a wide range of statutes.
Part I also explores how anti-messiness arguments interact with other
interpretive norms, including stare decisis, the avoidance canon, and
the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Part II considers some problems with the Court's use of anti-mess-
iness arguments. Prominent among these problems are: (1) the loose-
ness of the principle, which lends itself to inconsistent and subjective
invocation; (2) judicial shirking; (3) the Court's use of the principle
to reject nuanced constructions that may be necessary to avoid cir-
cumvention of a statute's purpose; and (4) the Court's use of anti-
messiness arguments anticipatorily to reject plausible statutory con-
structions based on mere predictions. Part III then examines the the-
oretical implications of the anti-messiness principle. The first two
sections of Part III discuss the anti-messiness principle's general juris-
prudential underpinnings, identifying points of overlap between anti-
messiness arguments and the concept of judicial minimalism, as well
as parallels between the anti-messiness principle and the rules versus
standards paradigm. The last few sections explore how anti-messiness
arguments intersect with current theories of statutory interpretation,
including: textualism, purposivism, and pragmatism.
I. WHAT IS "ANTI-MESSINESS"?
My first goal is to define the principle of anti-messiness. A defini-
tion will enable readers to identify when the norm is being invoked as
well as to compare use of the principle to the use of other interpretive
tools and decisionmaking factors in a particular case. Once I have
defined the norm, I will examine specific forms of anti-messiness argu-
ments that the Supreme Court tends to make.
ANTI-MESSINESS PRINCIPLE
A. Definition
Anti-messiness refers to a background principle that favors the
avoidance of inelegant, complex, indeterminate, impractical, confus-
ing, or unworkable factual inquiries. More specifically, it is an inter-
pretive principle that rejects statutory interpretations that will require
implementing courts to engage in messy factual inquiries in the appli-
cation. I chose the label "anti-messiness" because its antithesis, "messi-
ness," seems best to capture the universe of interpretive problems that
the Court seeks to avoid when it makes the arguments described in
this Article. Dictionaries variously define the word "messy" to mean:
1. untidy, disordered, dirty; 2. confused and difficult to deal with; 3. embar-
rassing, difficult, or unpleasant.10 Anti-messiness, then, refers to the
Supreme Court's rejection of statutory constructions that require dis-
orderly, untidy, unpleasant, or difficult factual inquiries or factual
line-drawing by implementing courts. In other words, the anti-messi-
ness principle reflects a judicial preference for simple, easy-to-admin-
ister interpretations.
A couple of points are worth noting before delving into the moti-
vations and typology of anti-messiness arguments. First, judicial argu-
ments based on the anti-messiness principle tend to perform one of
two roles in the Court's statutory jurisprudence: (i) they can be used
as an interpretive tool to assist the Court in deciphering a statute's
meaning; or (ii) they can serve as a justification for the Court's adop-
tion of a particular test or decisionmaking rule that will govern the
implementation of the statute in future cases (like the Title VII bur-
den-shifting test). 1I In the first role, anti-messiness arguments tend to
be used as a "plus factor," or background norm supporting the selec-
tion of one construction over another, messier one. In this formula-
tion, they sometimes are accompanied by legislative intent arguments
opining that Congress could not or did not intend such messy inter-
pretive consequences.1 2 In the second role, the anti-messiness princi-
10 See, e.g., THE NEW OXFORD AMERiCAN DICTIONARY 1073 (2001); RANDOM HOUSE
UNABRIDGED DIcTIONARY 1206 (2d ed. 1993); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 892
(2d Collegiate ed. 1982); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1418 (3d
ed. 1993).
11 I am indebted to Abbe Gluck for illuminating this distinction.
12 See, e.g., Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp., 130 S. Ct. 2433, 2447
(2010) (refusing to read into Congress's recodification of statute an intent to produce
messy, practically difficult judicial factual determinations or cumbersome carrier
behavior that would ease these factual determinations); Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v.
Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571, 588 (2008) ("It strains credulity that Congress would have
abandoned this predictable, workable framework for the uncertain and complex
20121 1469
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ple is used not so much to interpret the statute as to assist the Court in
selecting a test for implementing it.
Hertz is an example of the second form of anti-messiness argu-
ment. The Court's opinion in that case openly relied on the anti-
messiness norm to justify its articulation of a presumption-i.e., an
implementation test-dictating that a corporation's "principal place
of business" should be the place where its "headquarters" are
located.13 That presumption self-consciously adopted the least messy,
or "simplest to administer," of several possible tests for implementing
the statute's "principal place of business" language.
By way of contrast, Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Negusie
v. Holder is a good example of the former, plus factor, use of the anti-
messiness principle. The issue in Negusie was whether the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act's "persecutor bar," which prohibits aliens who
have participated in the persecution of another person from
obtaining refugee status,14 applies when the alien's participation in
persecuting another was coerced, rather than voluntary. The
Supreme Court held that the statute was ambiguous and remanded to
the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to interpret the statute in
the first instance.15 In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia agreed that
the case should be remanded to the BIA, but argued that there were
good reasons for the agency to construe the statute not to contain an
exception for coerced conduct. Among the reasons he voiced were
concerns about the "overwhelming" and the "extremely difficult"
questions of fact that immigration judges would be forced to adjudi-
cate in order to determine whether an alien's acts of persecution were
voluntary or coerced-classic anti-messiness arguments. 16 Justice
accounting requirements that a cost-based rule would inflict on litigants, their attor-
neys, administrative agencies, and the courts.").
13 The Court in Hertz also justified its adoption of the "headquarters" presump-
tion as consistent with the statute's text and legislative history. See Hertz Corp. v.
Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192-94 (2010).
14 The Act provides that, "The term 'refugee' does not include any person who
ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion." Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101, 66 Stat. 166, as added by
Refugee Act of 1980, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 102-03 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42)).
15 The Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had ruled, relying on Supreme
Court precedent interpreting a different immigration statute, that the persecutor bar
contained no exception for coerced conduct. On appeal, the Supreme Court held
that the agency had misapplied its precedent to the INA and, accordingly, remanded
the case to give the BIA an opportunity to exercise its Chevron discretion to interpret
the statute in the first instance. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 520 (2009).
16 See id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Scalia's anti-messiness arguments were used not to advocate selection
of a particular test for implementing the "persecutor bar," but rather,
to define the meaning and reach of that statutory provision.
Second, although I confine my discussion in this Article to the
anti-messiness principle's operation and implications for statutory
interpretation, judicial reliance on the anti-messiness principle is by
no means limited to statutory interpretation cases. As noted earlier, a
judicial aversion to messy jurisprudence shows up in other areas of the
law as well-perhaps most prominently in the rules versus standards
debates that are so prevalent in constitutional law.17 The similarities
and differences between bright line rules and the anti-messiness prin-
ciple are discussed infra Part III.A. But two differences bear noting
here. First, the anti-messiness principle often is applied in statutory
contexts where there is no battle between a bright line rule versus a
loose, amorphous standard. That is, anti-messiness arguments often
are used to reject the application of a statute to a particular situation
or to relieve courts from the obligation to engage in cumbersome fac-
tual inquiries, without establishing any clear-cut rules.18 In fact, the
Court sometimes uses anti-messiness arguments to reject the exten-
sion of a statute's reach to a new situation, while employing or leaving
intact a loose, multi-factored standard governing such determina-
tions.19 In other words, the anti-messiness principle in statutory inter-
17 Scholars have, of course, debated the advantages and disadvantages of rules
versus standards in numerous other areas of law as well, including property, torts,
administrative law, law and economics, and election law. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette,
Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems, 82 VA. L. REv. 181 (1996); Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Russell
B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L.
REv. 23 (2000); Spencer Overton, Rules, Standards, and Bush v. Gore: Form and the Law
of Democracy, 37 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 65 (2002); Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules,
and Social Norms, 21 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 101 (1997); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and
Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577 (1988); Aaron D. Twerski, Seizing the Middle
Ground Between Rules and Standards in Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict
Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 521 (1982); Book Note, The Bureaucrats of
Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1685 (1993).
18 See, e.g., Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp., 130 S. Ct. 2433, 2447
(2010) (using anti-messiness argument about practical difficulty of courts' determin-
ing precise location where damages to goods occurred, along with textual, statutory
history, and purpose arguments, to justify statutory construction that the Carmack
Amendment does not govern shipments originating overseas; alternative interpreta-
tion would have forced courts to make a factual determination about the location
where damages to goods occurred, not to apply a standard).
19 See, e.g., Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1120-21
(2009) (applying complex predatory pricing standards to reject AT&T's price squeez-
ing claim as inadequate and noting, in passing, anti-messiness concerns about the
practical difficulty of requiring courts to police both wholesale and retail prices);
2012] 1471
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pretation is much more focused on preventing courts from engaging
in intricate factual inquiries than it is on avoiding judicial balancing
tests or the exercise of judicial discretion (both of which rules advo-
cates care very much about). Second, even where there is substantial
overlap between bright line rules and the anti-messiness principle-as
in those cases where the Court uses anti-messiness arguments to advo-
cate the overruling of statutory precedents-different concerns are
implicated in the statutory versus constitutional and common law con-
texts because of the unique role that congressional intent plays in stat-
utory interpretation. In other words, there may be good reasons why
we may want the Court to apply the anti-messiness principle differ-
ently in statutory cases than it does bright line rules in constitutional
or common law cases. By focusing a narrow lens on the Supreme
Court's use of the anti-messiness principle in statutory construction,
this Article seeks to address such particularized concerns.
B. A Typology
In my observation, there are five primary types of anti-messiness
arguments that the Court employs in statutory cases: (1) judicial exper-
tise arguments-which posit that judges are unqualified to conduct the
factual inquiries necessitated by a particular construction of the stat-
ute; (2) Indeterminacy arguments-which contend that the factual
inquiries required by a particular construction are indeterminate, or
unknowable, so that no one, including judges, can adequately imple-
ment the construction; (3) Practical difficulty arguments-which main-
tain that a particular construction of a statute will require
implementing courts to engage in factual assessments that are too dif-
ficult, cumbersome, complicated, or involved; (4) Inconsistency argu-
ments-which insist that a particular statutory construction is
confusing or ambiguous and provides insufficient guidance to lower
courts, so it will lead to unpredictable and inconsistent application;
and (5) Stare decisis defeating arguments-which declare that a particu-
lar statutory construction, previously adopted by the Court, has
proved "unworkable" for lower courts to implement and so should be
abandoned. This Section gives examples of each type of anti-messi-
Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 459 (2006) (applying a standard-like
proximate cause test to Ideal's RICO claims while noting that recognizing Ideal's
claim would require courts to engage in a "complex assessment" "calculat[ing] the
portion of National's price drop attributable to the alleged pattern of racketeering
activity"; again, the Court's problem is with the factual determinations that would be
required, not with the applicable standard).
[VOL. 87:41472
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ness argument and highlights some of the inconsistencies in the
Court's invocation of this background norm.
1. Judicial Inexpertness
One common type of anti-messiness argument that the Supreme
Court employs is the contention that courts lack the expertise neces-
sary to engage in the factual determinations required by a particular
statutory construction. This type of invocation of the anti-messiness
norm characterizes the interpretation at issue as dependent on factual
inquiries requiring specialized knowledge or skills, and casts the judi-
ciary as "ill-equipped" to conduct such inquiries.
A recent example of a judicial-inexpertness-focused anti-messi-
ness argument appears in Bartlett v. Strickland,20 a Voting Rights Act
(VRA) case. The Court in Bartlett relied on several interpretive
tools-including Supreme Court precedent, statutory text, and the
constitutional avoidance canon-to reach the conclusion that the
VRA does not require the creation of "crossover" voting districts in
which a substantial plurality of minority voters can combine with a
small percentage of white voters to elect a candidate of the minority's
choosing.21 In addition to these other common interpretive tools, the
opinion also placed significant weight on the anti-messiness norm,
particularly to support its avoidance canon argument.
Specifically, the Bartlett opinion noted that a construction requir-
ing crossover districts would force the judiciary to engage in messy
factual determinations about whether potential districts could func-
tion as crossover districts and "would place courts in the untenable
position of predicting many political variables and tying them to race-
based assumptions."2 2 To illustrate, the Court provided a lengthy list
of the thorny factual inquiries that lower courts would be forced to
undertake if it construed Section 2 to require the creation of cross-
over districts:
What percentage of white voters supported minority-preferred can-
didates in the past? How reliable would the crossover votes be in
future elections? What types of candidates have white and minority
voters supported together in the past and will those trends con-
tinue? Were past crossover votes based on incumbency and did that
depend on race? What are the historical turnout rates among white
and minority voters and will they stay the same?23
20 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009).
21 Id. at 1243-44 (precedent); id. at 1243 (text); id. at 1247 (avoidance canon).
22 Id. at 1244-45.
23 Id. at 1245.
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This use of a litany of (virtually impossible) factual queries that a
particular interpretation purportedly would force implementing
courts to engage is a common method for articulating anti-messiness
arguments. The litany beats the reader over the head with the untidi-
ness and inelegance-i.e., the messiness-of the interpretation that
the Court is rejecting. Indeed, it is almost as if the Court is arguing
that the sheer volume of factual inquiries compelled by a particular
statutory interpretation should render the interpretation inaccurate.
The Bartlett Court followed up its litany of factual queries by insisting
that judges "are inherently ill-equipped to make decisions based on highly
political judgments of the sort that crossover-district claims would
require."24 There is, significantly, quite a bit of rhetorical declaration
in the Bartlett majority's articulation of anti-messiness concerns, both
in the litany of queries it sets forth and in its characterization of the
judiciary's inexpertness. Such rhetoric is a common feature in the
Court's anti-messiness arguments and deserves critical analysis in eval-
uating the benefits and disadvantages of reliance on this background
norm.25
The Bartlett Court also used anti-messiness arguments to set the
stage for a constitutional avoidance argument that performs signifi-
cant work later in the opinion. The avoidance canon is an interpretive
rule that holds that if a statute is susceptible of two or more reasona-
ble constructions, one of which presents serious constitutional diffi-
culties, then courts should choose the interpretation that avoids such
difficulties.2 6 The Bartlett Court argued that the factual inquiries
necessitated by the crossover district construction would "require
courts to make inquiries based on racial classifications and race-based
predictions" and thus "raise [d] serious constitutional questions."27
Given this, the avoidance canon dictated that the Court should reject
the crossover district construction in favor of a constitutionally-safe
reading of the statute. Anti-messiness arguments thus performed
double work in Bartlett, operating both to cast the crossover district
construction as untenable and to support the Court's use of the avoid-
ance canon.
In Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Communications,28 the Court
similarly rejected a reading of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act
24 Id. (emphasis added).
25 See discussion infra Part II.A.
26 See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 719, 737-39 (2006); Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,
575 (1988); United States v. Delaware & Hudson, 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909).
27 Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1245.
28 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009).
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that would, it argued, require implementing courts to engage in com-
plex economic inquiries exceeding the limits of judges' expertise.
The Pacific Bell opinion did not lead with an anti-messiness argument,
but it did buttress its chosen statutory construction with the observa-
tion that "institutional concerns" also "counsel against" recognizing
AT&T's price squeezing claims because "[c]ourts are ill suited to act
as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other
terms of dealing."29 To cement its point, the opinion quoted a litany
of factual queries that implementing courts would have to confront to
evaluate price-squeezing claims, borrowing from a First Circuit opin-
ion criticizing such claims.30
The Court also criticized the price-squeezing construction of the
statute on the ground that price squeeze claims would "require[ ] the
court to assume the day-to-day controls characteristic of a regulatory
agency"31 because courts would be forced "simultaneously to police
both the wholesale and retail prices to ensure that rival firms are not
being squeezed." 32 The Court noted that "antitrust courts normally
avoid direct price administration, relying on rules and remedies ...
that are easier to administer."33 Pacific Bell thus relied not only on the
judiciary's lack of expertise with price administration and market
management to make its anti-messiness point; it also invoked an
underlying discomfort or background norm disfavoring excessive judi-
cial involvement in the administration of a statute. Reading between
the lines, the Court seemed to be saying that statutory constructions
that require recurring judicial factual inquiries should be avoided,
particularly if they involve technical matters with respect to which
29 Id. at 1120-21 (quoting Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004).
30 The litany reads as follows:
[H]ow is ajudge orjury to determine a 'fair price?' Is it the price charged by
other suppliers of the primary product? None exist. Is it the price that com-
petition 'would have set' were the primary level not monopolized? How can
the court determine this price without examining costs and demands,
indeed without acting like a rate-setting regulatory agency, the rate-setting
proceedings of which often last for several years? Further, how is the court
to decide the proper size of the price 'gap?' Must it be large enough for all
independent competing firms to make a 'living profit,' no matter how ineffi-
cient they may be? . . . And how should the court respond when costs or
demands change over time, as they inevitably will?




33 Id. (emphasis added).
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judges lack expertise. In other words, courts should construe a statute
and then get out of the game, not adopt interpretations that require a
continuing fact-assessing role for the judiciary.
In a related vein, judicial deference to agency interpretations
under the Chevron doctrine also can be viewed as a form of inexpert-
ness-based messiness avoidance. The Chevron doctrine provides a stan-
dard for judicial review of agency interpretations, so it falls into the
"decision-making rule" or "implementation test" category of anti-mess-
iness arguments, rather than the "plus factor" category. The Chevron
test helps lower courts avoid messy judicial inquiries in at least two
ways. First, the Chevron test simplifies the judiciary's role in interpret-
ing statutes by distilling the interpretive inquiry down to the basic
question of whether Congress has spoken directly to the matter at
issue; if it has, Congress's directive controls and the judicial inquiry
ends. If Congress has not spoken directly to the interpretive question
at issue, then the judicial inquiry is limited to assessing the "reasona-
bleness" of the agency's interpretation-a deferential standard that
almost always ends in rubber-stamping the agency's interpretation.
Second, the Chevron doctrine shields courts from engaging in policy
balancing and from becoming mired in the technical details of a stat-
ute's application to particular industries. From an anti-messiness per-
spective, the doctrine replaces judicial grappling over technical facts
and policy considerations with forced deference to interpretations
made by administrators who possess superior expertise. The language
of the Chevron opinion is explicit about this trade-off, justifying defer-
ence to the agency based on the "detailed, technical, complex"3 4
nature of the statutory scheme at issue and the observation that
" Ij]udges are not experts in the field."35
2. Practical Difficulty
I earlier described an example of an anti-messiness argument-in
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Negusie-which advocated
against a particular statutory construction based on the "extreme diffi-
culty" and "overwhelming" nature of the task that the construction
would force upon implementing courts.3 6 This form of anti-messiness
argument, resting on the practical difficulty of the factual determina-
tions that an interpretation imposes on implementing courts, is per-
34 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 848
(1984).
35 Id. at 865.
36 Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 526-28 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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haps the most prevalent form of anti-messiness argument employed by
the Supreme Court.
As such, it is worth examining the mechanics of this form of anti-
messiness argument in some detail. Recall that in Negusie, the Court
remanded the case to the BIA to determine whether the INA's "perse-
cutor bar" contained an exception for asylum applicants who had
been coerced into persecuting others. Justice Scalia's concurrence
advised the BIA that, on remand, there were good reasons to construe
the statute not to contain a coerced conduct exception, including
that:
Immigration judges already face the overwhelming task of attempt-
ing to recreate, by a limited number of witnesses speaking through
(often poor-quality) translation, events that took place years ago in
foreign, usually impoverished countries. Adding on top of that the
burden of adjudicating claims of duress and coercion, which are
extremely difficult to corroborate and necessarily pose questions of
degree that require intensely fact-bound line-drawing, would
increase the already inherently high risk of error.37
The structure of this argument bears noting. The argument pro-
ceeds in three steps: (1) The task faced by immigration judges imple-
menting the INA already is overwhelming (asserts facts, presumably
taking judicial notice thereof, to support this claim). (2) Construing
the INA's persecutor bar to contain a coerced conduct exception
would further exacerbate this task because of the difficulty of locating
the necessary evidence and because of the inherent difficulty of evalu-
ating duress and coercion claims. (3) Therefore, it would be best to
construe the statute not to contain an exception for coerced persecu-
tion. This use of the anti-messiness norm is striking in its willingness
to elevate administrative considerations above substantive rights. It is
true that the voluntariness of a persecutor's conduct likely will be diffi-
cult to determine as a factual matter. But courts regularly make such
difficult determinations in criminal cases involving intent or voluntari-
ness requirements, as well as in contracts and wills cases involving
claims of duress or undue influence. In other words, the anti-messi-
ness principle as used in the Negusie concurrence would absolve
implementing courts of a task that is common to the judicial enter-
prise, if complex and burdensome. Such use of the practical difficulty
form of anti-messiness argument is no anomaly; in fact, the Court
often invokes this type of argument to reject statutory interpretations
that require factual determinations that are well within the realm of
37 Id.
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judicial competence, though complicated and cumbersome to
conduct.
Allen v. Sieber 8 is another such example. Allen involved the toll-
ing provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA),39 which suspends AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations
on the filing of federal habeas petitions while "a properly filed appli-
cation for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect
to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending."40 At issue in Allen was
a state postconviction petition that had been rejected by the state
court as untimely. The Eleventh Circuit had ruled that the petition
should be considered "properly filed" because the state court had
rejected it based on a statute of limitations that operated as an affirm-
ative defense, rather than as a jurisdictional statute of limitations.41
The Supreme Court refused to adopt that construction, noting that
"whether a time limit is jurisdictional or an affirmative defense is often
a disputed question," and that "under the Court of Appeals'
approach, federal habeas courts would have to delve into the intricacies of
state procedural law in deciding whether a postconviction petition
rejected by the state courts as untimely was nonetheless 'properly
filed"' under AEDPA's tolling provision. 42 In other words, the Court
concluded that given the detailed, messy inquiries federal judges
would have to conduct to distinguish between state statutes of limita-
tions that are jurisdictional and those that are affirmative defenses, it
would be better not to distinguish at all and instead to impose a sim-
ple rule barring all untimely state court petitions.
The Court's avoidance of the messier statutory construction in
Allen is particularly noteworthy because the inquiry it sought to
avoid-i.e., "delv[ing] into the intricacies of state procedural law" 4 3-
is one that judges are uniquely qualified to undertake. State procedu-
ral law may not be the preferred bailiwick of federal courts, but fed-
eral judges certainly are capable of evaluating state statutes and state
cases to determine whether a particular statute of limitations is juris-
dictional or operates as an affirmative defense; indeed, they are
trained to do so.
Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertofft4 made similar use of the prac-
tical difficulty form of the anti-messiness principle. At issue in Richlin
38 552 U.S. 3 (2007).
39 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2) (2006).
40 Id.
41 Allen, 552 U.S. at 5.
42 Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
43 Id.
44 553 U.S. 571 (2008).
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was whether a prevailing party entitled to recover attorney's fees,
expenses, and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA)
could recover paralegal's fees at the prevailing market rate, or only at
the cost to the law firm of the paralegal's services. The Court unani-
mously construed the EAJA to allow prevailing parties to recover at
the market rate for paralegal's fees. Although the bulk of the opinion
focused on other tools of statutory construction-including text, legis-
lative intent and history, prior case law, and other fee-shifting stat-
utes-the opinion also relied, in passing, on the anti-messiness
principle. In one of the opinion's last few paragraphs, the Court ques-
tioned the "practical feasibility" of the cost-to-the-law-firm construc-
tion, warning that such a construction would create difficult
"accounting problems" for which "we do not believe that solutions are
readily to be found."45 The Court even used this anti-messiness argu-
ment as a guide to congressional intent, declaring that "[m]arket
practice provides by far the more transparent basis for calculating a
prevailing party's recovery" and that it "strains credulity that Congress
would have abandoned this predictable, workable framework for the
uncertain and complex accounting requirements that a cost-based
rule would inflict on litigants, their attorneys, administrative agencies,
and the courts."46
Again, the factual assessment that the Court sought to avoid is
one thatjudges should be well-qualified to make: Judges regularly cal-
culate reimbursable fees and costs under other fee-shifting statutes;
determining the cost of paralegal services to a law firm should be no
more difficult than those other inquiries. Moreover, judges and law-
yers are in the same profession as law firms and should not be wholly
unfamiliar with the concept of paralegal employ-thus, they should
be well positioned to evaluate the evidence regarding costs presented
by both sides and to settle on a fair figure.
The Court's messiness avoidance in Negusie, Allen, and Richlin
demonstrates that there is more to the background norm disfavoring
messy statutory constructions than a mere fear that judges will imple-
ment a statute incorrectly due to their lack of expertise. Indeed,
under the practical difficulty form of the anti-messiness principle, the
Court seems willing to reject statutory constructions that require cum-
bersome factual assessments as a matter of mere administrative conve-
nience. Practical difficulty thus seems to focus very much on the
judicial "administrability" of an interpretation or decisionmaking rule.
45 Id. at 588.
46 Id. at 588-89.
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The troubling matter, as I will discuss in detail infta,4 7 is the lack of an
established baseline for determining when an interpretation crosses
the inadministrability threshold and becomes too difficult, as a practi-
cal matter, to adopt.
3. Indeterminacy
Closely related to the practical difficulty form are indeterminacy-
based anti-messiness arguments. Indeterminacy arguments focus on
the inherent uncertainty or undiscoverability of the factual determina-
tions that an interpretation forces lower courts to pursue. The
Court's argument in such cases essentially is that the interpretation
compels a set of factual queries that are impossible for anyone, includ-
ing judges, to evaluate.
Holder v. Hall is an instructive example. There, the Court refused
to construe Section 2 of the VRA to allow challenges to the size of a
government body, based largely on indeterminacy-type anti-messiness
concerns. Specifically, the Court cited the impossibility of finding "a
reasonable alternative practice as a benchmark against which to mea-
sure the existing voting practice." 48 That is, the Court held that there
was no way to measure what the optimal size of a government body
should be, and therefore no way to evaluate whether the challenged
government body was too big or too small. 49 "Respondents," the
Court accused, "fail to explain where the search for reasonable alter-
native benchmarks should begin and end, and they provide no accept-
able principles for deciding future cases."50 Translation: A Section 2
cause of action against the size of a government body would prove
impossibly messy and undefined to implement. Because the "wide
range of possibilities [for benchmarks] makes the choice 'inherently
standardless,'" the Court concluded that it simply could not construe
Section 2 to allow challenges to the size of a government body.51
In so construing the VRA, the Holder majority rejected the size
benchmarks (and justifications for those benchmarks) offered by
those seeking to use § 2 to challenge the size of a governing body.5 2
47 See discussion infra Part II.A.
48 Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 880 (1994).
49 See id. at 881 ("[Tlhe search for a benchmark is quite problematic when a § 2
dilution challenge is brought to the size of a government body. There is no princi-
pled reason why one size should be picked over another as the benchmark for
comparison.").
50 Id. at 885.
51 Id. (emphasis added).
52 Id. at 881 (rejecting suggestion by challengers and the United States, as amicus
curiae, that a five-member commission should serve as the benchmark for the § 2 chal-
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This also was the case in Bartlett and Pacific Bell, where the Court
rejected suggested benchmarks for evaluating a district's crossover
potential53 and price squeezing claims, 5 4 respectively, and then went
on to conclude that the judiciary lacked the expertise to measure a
district's crossover potential or the existence of a price squeeze. Dis-
senting opinions in two of these cases argued that the rejected statu-
tory constructions were more consistent with the statute's purpose
and advocated embracing the messiness-limiting benchmarks prof-
fered by proponents of those constructions in order to fulfill the stat-
ute's objectives.5 5 These cases highlight some potential problems with
the Court's use of the anti-messiness norm in construing statutes: (1)
judicial discretion to ignore messiness-reducing limits on an otherwise
indeterminable factual inquiry and to decide how much messiness is
too much in a given context, and (2) the possibility that reliance on
the anti-messiness norm might lead to a statutory construction that
defeats congressional intent. These potential problems are discussed
in greater detail in Part II below.56
A second example of the indeterminacy form of anti-messiness
argument appears in Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp.,5 7
lenge at issue because, inter alia, five-member commissions were the most common
form of governing authority in the State and because the state legislature had author-
ized the relevant county to adopt a five-member commission if it so chose).
53 The Court ignored record evidence, relied upon by the dissent, suggesting that
a thirty-nine percent minority voting population could be used as a reliable bench-
mark for evaluating a district's crossover potential, based on past election results. See
Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 8-10 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting).
54 See Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 454-57
(2009) (rejecting "transfer price test" suggested by amici for identifying an unlawful
price squeeze).
55 See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 8-10 & n.5 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(advocating looking to recent election results suggesting a thirty-nine percent minor-
ity population as a workable benchmark for crossover district potential, arguing that
crossover districts better fulfill the VRA's ideals than the existing majority-minority
model, and explaining that failure to read VRA to require crossover districts could
lead to deliberate circumvention of VRA's core prohibition against vote dilution);
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 947, 951-52 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describ-
ing VRA's broad "remedial purpose," accusing the majority of undermining this pur-
pose, and maintaining that "the proposed five-member Bleckley County Commission
presents a reasonable, workable benchmark against which to measure" plaintiffs' § 2
vote-dilution claim). Because of a concession by one of the parties, there was no
dissenting opinion in Pacific Bell, but the concurring opinion in that case suggested
that recognizing price squeezing claims could be necessary to fulfill the Sherman
Act's anti-monopoly purposes. See Pacific Bell, 555 U.S. at 457-58 (2009) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
56 See infra Part II.A, C.
57 130 S. Ct. 2433 (2010).
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in which the Court refused to construe a statute called the Carmack
Amendment to apply to the inland domestic segment of an overseas
shipment. Kawasaki involved the interaction of two statutes, the Car-
riage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) ,58 which governs contracts issued
by ocean carriers engaged in foreign trade, and the Carmack Amend-
ment,5 9 which governs contracts issued by domestic rail carriers.6 0
The Court relied on text,61 precedent, 62 statutory history,63 and pur-
pose-based 64 arguments to conclude that the Carmack Amendment
did not apply to the inland portion of a shipment originating over-
seas, and this time used anti-messiness arguments to support its pur-
pose-based arguments. The Court first noted that Carmack's purpose
was to relieve cargo owners "of the burden of searching out a particu-
lar negligent carrier from among the often numerous carriers han-
dling an interstate shipment of goods," 65 and that Carmack achieved
this purpose by imposing liability for damage caused during the rail
route on both receiving and delivering rail carriers, regardless of
which carrier caused the damage. It then observed that:
If Carmack applied to an inland segment of a shipment from over-
seas under a through bill, then one set of liability and venue rules
would apply when cargo is damaged at sea (COGSA) and another
almost always would apply when the damage occurs on land (Car-
mack). Rather than making claims by cargo owners easier to
resolve, a court would have to decide where the damage occurred to
determine which law applied. As a practical matter, this requirement
often could not be met, for damage to the content of containers can
occur when the contents are damaged by rough handling, seepage,
or theft, at some unknown point.66
In other words, the Court based its statutory construction, in part,
on a fear that the reading it rejected would force judges to engage in
indeterminable factual inquiries about the nature and point in the
58 46 U.S.C. § 30701 (2006).
59 46 U.S.C. § 11706 (2006).
60 The specific dispute at issue involved damage to cargo that had been shipped
from a port in China to California, where it was transferred to a domestic rail carrier;
the damage allegedly occurred during the domestic rail portion of the transport. The
applicability or inapplicability of the Carmack Amendment to the parties' transporta-
tion contract-determined the forum in which the damages suit could be brought. See
Kawasaki, 130 S. Ct. at 2441-42.
61 Id. at 2442-43.
62 Id. at 2443.
63 Id. at 2446-47.
64 Id. at 2447.
65 Id. at 2441 (quoting Reider v. Thompson, 339 U.S. 113, 119 (1950)).
66 Id. at 2447 (emphasis added).
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journey during which cargo damage occurred-inquiries which often
would contain no discernable answer. Moreover, it explained that
such unanswerable factual inquiries would undermine Carmack's pur-
pose of eliminating the burden on cargo owners to uncover which of
several carriers damaged their goods.
The dichotomy between the purpose-fulfilling application of anti-
messiness arguments in Kawasaki versus the (at least allegedly) pur-
pose-defeating use of such arguments in Holder, Bartlett, and Pacific
Bell suggests a potentially significant dividing line for application of
the anti-messiness principle: use of the principle to decide jurisdic-
tional issues as opposed to issues that go to the heart of a statute's
substantive objectives. The statutory construction at issue in Kawasaki
ultimately was about jurisdictional matters-specifically, the forum in
which the cargo owner's damages suit could be brought and which
statute, Carmack or COGSA, would govern the carrier's liability. The
constructions at issue in Holder, Bartlett, and Pacific Bell, by contrast,
went to the heart of establishing what kinds of voting and price dis-
crimination claims would be covered under the VRA and the Sherman
Act. In Part II of this Article, I discuss the implications of relying on
the anti-messiness principle in each of these contexts and suggest that
the principle is more defensible when applied to jurisdictional statu-
tory constructions than to constructions that affect the substantive
reach of a statute.67
4. Inconsistency
Anti-messiness arguments also may be phrased in the form of
concerns that a particular statutory construction either has proved or
will prove confusing, ambiguous, and therefore inconsistent for lower
courts to implement. This was the form of argument at work in Hertz,
which rejected the Courts of Appeals' "divergent and increasingly
complex interpretations" of the phrase "principle place of business"
in favor of a "comparatively" simplified presumption that the place
where a corporation's headquarters are located ordinarily is its princi-
ple place of business.68
The Hertz opinion also referenced the statute's text69 and legisla-
tive history70 in support of its construction, but its emphasis was on
the jurisprudential mess that lower courts had made thus far in inter-
preting the phrase "principal place of business." For example, the
67 See infra Part IIE.
68 Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192-93 (2010).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1194.
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Court noted the growing number of factors that lower courts were
taking into consideration under various "principal place of business"
tests and highlighted the inconsistencies in applying these factors
across courts, sometimes even within the same Circuit.71 The Court
then explained that there is a particular need for clarity and predict-
ability in jurisdictional statutes72 and concluded that the "relatively
easier to apply" headquarters presumption thus should replace
existing tests for determining a corporation's "principal place of
business."73
The Court's opinion in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.74
similarly invoked inconsistency-based anti-messiness arguments to sup-
port its rejection of a longstanding lower court test for implementing
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.75 Morrison concerned
whether, and under what circumstances, § 10(b) could be read to pro-
vide a cause of action for foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and American
defendants for misconduct in connection with securities traded on for-
eign exchanges.76 For nearly forty years, the Second Circuit and other
Courts of Appeals following its lead had applied a multi-factor test to
determine whether a § 10(b) claim involving foreign plaintiffs, for-
eign defendants, or a foreign exchange "had a substantial effect in the
United States or upon United States citizens," or involved "wrongful
conduct [that] occurred in the United States."77 If the requisite
effects or conduct could be found, then the § 10(b) claim could go
forward.
The Supreme Court in Morrison, however, characterized the
"effects" and "conduct" tests as an unfortunate departure from the
basic interpretive presumption that laws enacted by Congress are not
meant to have extraterritorial effect.7 8 It then employed anti-messi-
ness arguments to hold that the Second Circuit's nuanced test should
be abandoned and § 10(b) held inapplicable to securities transactions
involving foreign actors or exchanges. Specifically, the Court noted
that the "effects" and "conduct" tests "were not easy to administer"
and that they led to different results depending on numerous fact-
specific inquiries such as whether the harmed investors were Ameri-
71 Id. at 1191-92.
72 Id. at 1193.
73 Id. at 1194.
74 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
75 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
76 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2873.
77 See id. at 2878-79 (quoting SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192-93 (2d Cir.
2003)).
78 Id. at 2877-78.
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can citizens or foreigners, and whether the United States was a "base"
for fraudulent activities in other countries. 79 The result, the Court
lamented, was "a proliferation of vaguely related variations on the
'conduct' and 'effects' tests"80 throughout the different circuits and
difficulty for district courts attempting to apply "such vague formula-
tions."8' In light of this doctrinal confusion, the Court opted to rein-
state the presumption against extraterritorial application of § 10(b)
claims to any claims involving foreign plaintiffs, defendants, or
exchanges.
In both Hertz and Morrison, the Court applied the inconsistency
form of the anti-messiness argument to reject statutory constructions
that lower courts had followed for years, but this is not the only con-
text in which this form of argument can be invoked. In Roell v.
Withrow,82 for example, the dissenting opinion similarly used the
inconsistency form to argue that the construction adopted by the
majority would be impossible to implement. Roell raised the question
whether the Federal Magistrate Act 83 requires explicit consent from
the parties before a magistrate judge may conduct a case, or whether
consent can be inferred from a party's conduct during litigation. 4
The majority opinion relied on text,85 "pragmatic reasons,"8 6 and the
statute's purpose 7 to conclude that the parties' consent could be
implied where "the litigant or counsel was made aware of the need for
consent and the right to refuse it, and still voluntarily appeared to try
the case before the Magistrate Judge."8 Justice Thomas, joined by
three other justices, roundly criticized this reading on both textual
and anti-messiness grounds.80 The dissent complained that "the
majority's test for determining whether a party has given adequate
implied consent . . . is rife with ambiguities"90 and launched into a
litany of factual inquiries illustrating the potential morass of questions
that lower courts would have to explore in order to evaluate whether
the parties' actions sufficed to provide implied consent.91 The dissent
79 Id. at 2879.
80 Id. at 2880.
81 Id. at 2879.
82 538 U.S. 580 (2003).
83 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1) (2006).
84 See Roell, 538 U.S. at 582.
85 Id. at 587.
86 Id. at 588.
87 Id. at 588-89.
88 Id. at 590.
89 Id. at 592-94 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 595-96.
91 The litany of factual inquiries reads as follows:
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also criticized the majority for trading the "clarity and predictability"
of an explicit consent construction in favor of a construction that
would force lower courts "to study the record of a proceeding on a
case-by-case basis, searching for patterns in the parties' behavior that
would provide sufficient indicia of voluntariness" to constitute implied
consent.92
In other words, the Roell dissenters worried, like the majority in
Hertz and Morrison, that the construction at issue would prove too con-
fusing and vague for lower courts to implement in a consistent man-
ner. This focus on actual lower court confusion over a statutory
construction, or predictions of future lower court confusion over a
newly articulated construction, is a different species of anti-messiness
argument than those discussed earlier in this Part. The inconsistency
form quarrels with the messiness engendered by the Court's lack of
clarity as to which factual determinations matter, and to what
degree-rather than on the messiness produced by judicial grappling
with the factual determinations themselves. That is, a Court invoking
the inconsistency form of the anti-messiness principle is not con-
cern d that it will be practically difficult or impossible to determine
where a corporation's officers are located or where most of its sales
occur. Rather, the Court is concerned that even once those facts have
been determined, it will remain unclear where the corporation's prin-
cipal place of business is and, worse, that two different courts asking
the same questions could come up with two different principal places
of business because of the vagueness of the decisionmaking rule.
C. Anti-Messiness and Stare Decisis
A form of anti-messiness principle also has been long at work in
the stare decisis context, as a justification for overruling precedents
that have proved "confusing" or "unworkable" to implement.93 In this
How are the courts to determine whether the litigant or counsel "was made
aware of the need to consent and the right to refuse it"? Are courts required
to search beyond the record and inquire into whether a clerk of the court
informed either a litigant or his counsel of the litigant's rights and provided
them with requisite forms to sign? Can courts rely, if applicable, on the par-
ties' participation in other unrelated proceedings before a magistrate judge?
Id. at 596.
92 Id.
93 See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989)
("Another traditional justification for overruling a prior case is that a precedent may
be a positive detriment to coherence and consistency in the law ... because of inher-
ent confusion created by an unworkable decision . . . .") (citing Continental T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 433 U.S. 36, 47-48 (1977); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111,
124-25 (1965)).
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form, the anti-messiness principle is used to trump the rule of stare
decisis, which ordinarily obligates judges to follow the decisional rules
established in prior cases. This use of the messiness avoidance norm
is of course common in contexts beyond statutory interpretation.9 4
But as with the other forms of anti-messiness arguments examined in
this Article, this Part limits its discussion of how anti-messiness argu-
ments are used to override stare decisis to the statutory context-both
in the interest of space and because the relevance of congressional
intent in statutory interpretation presents unique considerations wor-
thy of independent analysis.
In Swift & Co. v. Wickham,9 5 for example, the Court overturned a
complicated implementation test that it previously had adopted for
determining when a three-judge district court panel was required to
review lawsuits seeking to enjoin a state statute as unconstitutional.9 6
In so doing, the Court overruled a prior precedent, Kesler v. Depart-
ment of Public Safety,97 observing that:
We are now convinced that the Kesler rule, distinguishing between
cases in which substantial statutory construction is required and
those in which the constitutional issue is "immediately" apparent, is
in practice unworkable. Not only has it been uniformly criticized by
commentators, but lower courts have quite evidently sought to avoid
dealing with its application or have interpreted it with uncertainty.9 8
In other words, the Kesler precedent had proved confusing and
impracticable to implement. In a much-quoted formulation, Swift
explained that under such circumstances, stare decisis must give way
to the need for clear jurisdictional rules:
Unless inexorably commanded by statute, a procedural principle of
this importance should not be kept on the books in the name of
94 See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305-06 (2004) (discussing and
rejecting an unworkable standard for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims);
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (discussing
unworkability of Roe); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531
(1985) (rejecting the "traditional government functions test" as unworkable).
95 382 U.S. 111 (1965).
96 The implementation test, which had been established in Kesler v. Dep't of Pub.
Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962) (overruled in part by Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637
(1971)), dictated that when the basis for enjoining the state statute was an alleged
conflict with or preemption by a federal statute-rather than a substantive constitu-
tional problem-the three-judge panel was required "only when the Supremacy
Clause of the Federal Constitution is immediately drawn in question, but not when
issues of federal or state statutory construction must first be decided even though the
Supremacy Clause may ultimately be implicated." Swift, 382 U.S. at 115.
97 369 U.S. 153 (1962).
98 Swift, 382 U.S. at 124 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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stare decisis once it is proved to be unworkable in practice; the mis-
chievous consequences to litigants and courts alike from the perpet-
uation of an unworkable rule are too great.99
In place of the Kesler rule, the Court adopted a "more practicable"
construction that simplified the basis for three-judge review, allowing
it only where substantive constitutional issues were the basis for chal-
lenge to a state statute. 0to
The Court in Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.10 simi-
larly abandoned two precedents on the grounds that they were "hope-
lessly unworkable in operation."102 Gulfstream, like Swift, involved the
construction of a jurisdictional statute-governing the circumstances
under which a district court order denying a motion to stay or dismiss
an action is immediately appealable.103 The Court held that no imme-
diate appeal was available in the present case and in the process over-
ruled two longstanding precedents, Enelow v. New York Life Insurance
Co. 104 and Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,105 which held that
orders granting or denying stays of "legal" proceedings on "equitable"
grounds were immediately appealable injunctions. Gulfstream cata-
logued the difficulties that lower courts had experienced in applying
the Enelow-Ettelson precedents over the years, particularly once the his-
torical distinction between law and equity had disappeared, 06 and
criticized the precedents' "tendency to produce incongruous
results."' 0 7 Again, the confusion, inconsistency, and lower court inabil-
ity to implement the prior precedents' constructions overrode stare
decisis concerns in the Court's view.
In a similar vein is Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 08 which
overruled a longstanding precedent called The Harrisburg.0 9 The Har-
99 Id. at 116.
100 The Court justified this construction based on the history and purpose of the
three-judge panel statute. Id. at 125-26.
101 485 U.S. 271 (1988).
102 Id. at 284.
103 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2006).
104 293 U.S. 379 (1935).
105 317 U.S. 188 (1942).
106 Gulfstream, 485 U.S. at 279-88. "Experience since the merger of law and
equity, however, has shown that both questions are frequently difficult and sometimes
insoluble. Suits that involve diverse claims and request diverse forms of relief often
are not easily categorized as equitable or legal. As one Court of Appeals complained
in handling such a suit, 'Enelow-Ettelson is virtually impossible to apply to a com-
plaint.'" Id. at 284 (citation omitted).
107 Id. at 282.
108 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
109 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
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risburg held that maritime law did not afford a cause of action for
wrongful death. Among the reasons the Moragne Court gave for over-
ruling the precedent was that, along with a related case, it "has pro-
duced litigation-spawning confusion in an area that should be easily
susceptible of more workable solutions."' 10 Moragne went on to state
that "[t]o supplant the present disarray in this area with a rule both
simpler and more just will further, not impede, efficiency in adjudica-
tion." 1' Again, the jurisprudential mess produced by the prior prece-
dent justified the abandonment of stare decisis.
A striking theme among these older stare-decisis-defeating anti-
messiness cases is that they all involved jurisdictional statutes. More
recent examples in which the Court has allowed-or several members
of the Court have argued in favor of allowing-anti-messiness consid-
erations to trump stare decisis exist as well, but they involve the con-
struction of nonjurisdictional statutes. In Altria Group v. Good," 2 for
example, the Court was called upon to construe the preemption pro-
vision of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
(FCLAA). Plaintiffs had brought state law claims for fraudulent
misrepresentation against cigarette manufacturers, and the Court had
to decide whether such claims were preempted by the FCLAA." 4 The
majority opinion, which concluded that plaintiffs' fraudulent misrep-
resentation claims were not preempted, relied heavily on a prior pre-
cedent, Cipollone v. Liggett Group."5 The Altria majority opinion
expressly acknowledged that the Cipollone test for evaluating state law
claims for preemption "may lack 'theoretical elegance"' but applied
the test anyway out of respect for stare decisis and because, in its view,
the test fulfilled Congress's purpose. 16
By contrast, Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion, joined by Jus-
tices Scalia, Roberts, and Alito, severely criticized the Cipollone predi-
cate-duty test as unduly messy and intricate, and called for its
overruling. Justice Thomas's dissent observed that "the lower courts
have consistently expressed frustration at the difficulty in applying the Cipol-
lone plurality's test."" 7 The dissent cited several lower court opinions
110 Moragne, 398 U.S. at 404.
111 Id. at 405.
112 555 U.S. 70 (2008).
113 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2006).
114 Altria, 555 U.S. at 81-82.
115 Cipollone directed implementing courts to examine each state law claim indi-
vidually and to ask whether the claim was predicated "on a duty 'based on smoking
and health.'" 505 U.S. 504, 528 (1992).
116 Altria, 555 U.S. at 84 (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 529-30).
117 Id. at 92 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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complaining about the complexity of the Cipollone test and charged
that "Cipollone's distinctions, though clear in theory, defy clear applica-
tion."'18 The dissent then argued, citing Swift, that "[t]he Court
should not retain an interpretive test that has proved incapable of
implementation."e19 "Stare decisis considerations carry little weight,"
the dissent argued, "when an erroneous 'governing decision' has cre-
ated an 'unworkable legal' regime." 12 0 For the dissenters, the juris-
prudential messiness of the Cipollone test should have spelled its
doom, particularly given that Cipollone was a plurality opinion. 121
Another recent case in which the Court used the anti-messiness
principle to reject the application of a relevant, though not quite con-
trolling, precedent is Gross v. FBL Financial Services.12 2 Gross con-
cerned whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) 1 23 permits age discrimination to be proved-or at least the
burden of proof shifted to the employer-if the plaintiff introduces
evidence showing that age was a "motivating factor" in the employer's
decision. The ADEA's anti-discrimination provisions were modeled
on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 124 and a plurality of the Supreme
Court previously held, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, that "motivating
factor" or "mixed motives" evidence sufficed to show discrimination
under Title VII.12 5 Although the plurality opinion was not initially
considered controlling,1 2 6 the 1991 Civil Rights Act essentially codi-
fied the "motivating factor" approach for Title VII cases a few years
later. 127
Despite the parity between the ADEA and Title VII, a majority of
the Court refused, in Gross, to apply the motivating factor construc-
tion to the ADEA. Gross distinguished the ADEA from Title VII, argu-
ing, inter alia, that the burden of persuasion is different for the ADEA
118 Id. at 97 (emphasis added) (quoting Altria Grp. v. Good, 436 F. Supp. 2d 132,
142 (Me. 2006)).
119 Id. at 97 (citing Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. I1 (1985)).
120 Id. at 98 (citation omitted).
121 Id. at 96.
122 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
123 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2006).
124 490 U.S.C. § 228 (2006).
125 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
126 Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, which provided the fifth vote in the
case, generally was considered the controlling opinion in Price Waterhouse. See, e.g.,
Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 308 F.3d 335, 337 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002). Justice O'Connor's con-
currence interpreted Title VII to require a plaintiff to show "direct" evidence that a
discriminatory motive played a "substantial" role in the employer's decision. Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
127 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-2002(m) (2006).
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than it is for Title VII and that Congress had treated the two statutes
differently when it expressly endorsed the Price Waterhouse plurality's
acceptance of "motivating factor" evidence in its 1991 amendments to
Title VII, without simultaneously amending the ADEA in the same
manner.128 Gross then turned to anti-messiness arguments, declaring
that "it has become evident in the years since [Pice Waterhouse] was
decided that its burden-shifting framework is difficult to apply. For exam-
ple, in cases tried to a jury, courts have found it particularly difficult to
craft an instruction to explain its burden-shifting framework."1 29
Given the problems experienced in applying Price Waterhouse's frame-
work, the majority argued, it made no sense to extend that framework
to the ADEA.
Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion in Gross insisted that Price
Waterhouse directly governed construction of the ADEA and lamented
the majority's "utter disregard of our precedent and Congress's
intent."130 The dissent dismissed the majority's anti-messiness con-
cerns on the ground that Congress's express endorsement of the
"motivating factor" framework in its 1991 amendments to Title VII
should trump any anti-messiness objections regarding that
construction.13'
Although both Altria and Gross involved the overruling (or advo-
cated overruling) of plurality opinions rather than more firmly
entrenched precedents, when viewed along with Swift, Gulfstream, and
Moragne, they demonstrate the established role that anti-messiness
concerns play in the reconsideration of prior precedents. The back-
ground norm is powerful enough that it can justify setting aside rule
of law concerns-or, put differently, it is on a par with rule of law
concerns and can trump the concern for stability of legal rules. Two
things bear noting here. First, every stare-decisis-defeating application
of the anti-messiness principle discussed in this Section involved an
implementation test rather than an ordinary "what does X phrase
mean?" interpretation of a statute. This makes sense; it may well be
easier, and involve less embarrassing back-pedaling, for the Supreme
128 Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349.
129 Id. at 2352 (emphasis added).
130 Id. at 2353-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("That the Court is construing the
ADEA rather than Title VII does not justify this departure from precedent. The rele-
vant language in the two statutes is identical, and we have long recognized that our
interpretations of Title VII's language apply 'with equal force in the context of age
discrimination, for the substantive provisions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba
from Title VII.'" (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
131 Id. at 2356-57 ("Because Congress has codified a mixed-motives framework for
Title VII cases-the vast majority of antidiscrimination lawsuits-the Court's concerns
about that framework are of no moment.").
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Court to overturn its own rules for implementing a statute than for it
to overturn its previous conclusions about what a statutory phrase or
word means. This is particularly so given that Congress's silence in
response to the Supreme Court's statutory pronouncements generally
is taken as a sign of legislative acquiescence in the Court's interpreta-
tion. Indeed it may be much more difficult, politically and institution-
ally, for the Court to declare, "No, no, no-the statute does not really
mean what we said it means, even though Congress has not corrected
our interpretation," than it is for the Court to state, "The test we cre-
ated for implementing this statute is proving impossible for lower
courts to apply, so even though Congress has not noticed the judicial
confusion, it is time that we step in and fix it." In other words, the
meaning of a statute is Congress's creation, with courts stepping in as
Congress's agents to clarify that meaning when necessary. Conse-
quently, judicial back-and-forth on statutory meaning runs the risk of
resembling illegitimate judicial policymaking, in lieu of respect for
Congress's enactments. Tests for implementing statutes, by contrast,
more arguably can be said to fall to the judiciary to define, so that
even if Congress has not noticed how such tests are faring in the lower
courts, the Supreme Court has the authority to tweak them.
Second, there is a notable distinction between the older cases dis-
cussed in this Section-Swift, Gulfstream, and Moragne--and the two
recent Roberts Court cases, Altria and Gross. As highlighted earlier,
the former, older cases involved jurisdictional statutes and garnered
widespread judicial support for the overturning of longstanding
precedents based on anti-messiness concerns,13 2 whereas the latter,
more recent cases were ones in which the Court split down the middle
over the appropriateness of overturning less stable (i.e., plurality)
precedents involving substantive statutory matters (the availability of
state tort claims and the ADEA). Part II.E below explores this distinc-
tion and suggests that there may be good reasons for limiting applica-
tion of the anti-messiness principle to jurisdictional statutes-or at
least for assigning the principle different weight in different statutory
contexts.
II. SOME PROBLEMS WITH "ANI--MESSINESS"
The jurisprudential appeal of the anti-messiness principle is easy
to understand. Clarity, simplicity, and predictability are important
rule of law values, and efficient judicial administration is a natural
132 Gulfstream and Moragne were decided unanimously; Swit was a 6-3 decision. See
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988); Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970); Swift v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965).
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concern of courts articulating decisional rules for future application.
Moreover, the idea of avoiding complex, difficult-to-administer statu-
tory interpretations is intuitively compelling. But there are also signif-
icant dangers associated with judicial reliance on the anti-messiness
principle to construe statutes. First is the principle's conceptual loose-
ness. At least as presently employed by the Supreme Court, the princi-
ple lacks clear definition or limits and tends to be invoked in an ad
hoc manner, with little weighing of systemic countervailing concerns.
Second, and related to the first, is a judicial shirking problem: the
Court sometimes invokes the anti-messiness principle to discard statu-
tory constructions that it is perfectly capable of implementing, simply
because they are inelegant. Third, reliance on the principle can lead
to statutory constructions that prohibit only the most explicit viola-
tions of a statutory provision, allowing sophisticated actors to engage
in more subtle manipulations that violate the purpose, though per-
haps not the simplest reading, of the statute. Fourth, all of these
potential problems are amplified by the fact that the anti-messiness
principle often leads courts to reject a plausible statutory construction
anticipatorily, based on ex ante predictions that it will prove difficult,
indeterminate, inconsistent, or otherwise problematic to implement.
This Part discusses each of the above dangers in turn. The last
Section posits that the identified dangers may be mitigated in the case
ofjurisdictional statutes, or statutes involving threshold questions, and
suggests guiding principles for evaluating whether a particular statu-
tory application of the anti-messiness principle is appropriate.
A. Looseness
The most prominent danger presented by the anti-messiness
principle is that "messiness" is an amorphous concept, one that defies
precise definition and invites subjectivity. Perhaps as a result, the
Court's invocation of anti-messiness arguments has been, at least thus
far, doctrinally unmoored. The Court has no established criteria for
when the principle can or should be invoked, and it tends to articu-
late its anti-messiness arguments in an ad hoc manner, with ipse dixit
declarations that a construction will prove difficult, beyond judicial
expertise, indeterminate, or confusing often substituting for careful
or rigorous analysis.
In this sense, the anti-messiness principle parallels the absurd
results canon, which holds that courts may deviate from even the
clearest statutory text when a given interpretation otherwise would
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produce "absurd" results.133 One problem with the absurd results
canon is that whether a result is absurd often ends up being a judg-
ment call, leaving significant discretion and room for disagreement
among judges.I3 4. As John Manning has explained, the absurd results
doctrine permits judges to decide cases "based on vaguely defined
social values," rather than on sources or interpretive tools that are
more immediately linked to the legislative process. 135 A similar prob-
lem seems to exist with the anti-messiness principle. Like absurdity,
messiness seems to be a loose concept, based on individual jurists' gut
instincts and vaguely defined notions of complexity, indeterminacy,
unwieldiness, and the like.
As a result, there is a lot of rhetorical declaration in the Court's
articulations of anti-messiness arguments, and little principled discus-
sion or weighing of competing concerns. Indeed, the most common,
consistent feature in the Court's articulation of anti-messiness argu-
ments seems to be the litany-of-factual-queries device, which tends to
substitute rhetorical cleverness-beating the reader over the head
with a series of questions-for analytic rigor or actual evidence of
messiness. The Court simply announces that an interpretation will
prove messy to implement (or has proved messy to implement, in cer-
tain cases) and so should be rejected-but in so doing, it does not
provide the reader with any baseline for determining when a statutory
interpretation crosses the inadministrability threshold and becomes
too practically difficult, indeterminate, or confusing to adopt. With-
out such a baseline, there is no way for the public, legislature, or other
actors to keep the Court honest, or to check its invocation of the prin-
ciple. We are simply supposed to defer to the Court's judgment that
an interpretation has crossed the line, even when the members of the
Court themselves disagree about this and even when the Court
declares this in one sentence with no further explanation.
133 See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARv. L. REv. 2387, 2388
(2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REv. 953, 986 (1995). For
examples of cases in which courts have applied the absurd results canon to avoid
otherwise clear statutory text, see Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429
(1998); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454-55 (1989); Jackson v.
Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 386 U.S. 731, 735 (1967); United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 27
(1948); Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 333
(1938); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 447-49 (1932); United States v. Katz,
271 U.S. 354, 362 (1926); Hawaii v. Mankichl, 190 U.S. 197, 213-14 (1903); Church of
the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 465 (1892); United States v. Kirby, 74
U.S. 482 (1868).
134 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 133, at 2443 (characterizing as "openly legisla-
tive" the "nature of the discretion" the doctrine confers on judges).
135 Id. at 2392.
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To some extent, looseness is a problem from which all interpre-
tive canons based on background norms suffer. That is, almost all
background-norm-based canons leave significant room for judicial
policymaking and selectivity about when to invoke the norm, while
providing little in the way of guidelines to restrain judges. They are,
as Justice Scalia has noted, akin to placing a "thumb of indeterminate
weight" on one side of the balance.1 3 6 On the one hand, given that
the looseness problem is so endemic, one might conclude that per-
haps we should not worry about it any more in the context of the anti-
messiness principle than we do when considering other background
norm-based presumptions. On the other hand, however, the loose-
ness and lack of rigor attendant to the anti-messiness principle are
compounded by the fact that the Court, when invoking anti-messiness
arguments, does so with an air of definitiveness and neutrality. While
most other background norms are avowedly policy oriented-e.g., the
rule of lenity,13 7 the rule that remedial statutes are to be liberally con-
strued, 13 8 or the rule that statutes dealing with Native Americans'
rights are to be resolved in favor of Native Americans' 39-the Court's
anti-messiness arguments come cloaked with the imprimatur of
administrative necessity and impartiality. Moreover, the Court's deci-
sions about when to invoke the anti-messiness principle in its statutory
constructions-and about how thoroughly to explain the need for
messiness avoidance in a particular context-seem much more varia-
ble than does its reliance on other background norms.
B. Judicial Competence
As some of the cases discussed earlier demonstrate, the Court
sometimes uses anti-messiness arguments to reject statutory construc-
tions that require factual inquiries which judges are well equipped to
conduct. In Richlin, Allen, and Negusie,140 for example, the Court (or
concurrence, in Negusie) used the anti-messiness principle to reject
statutory readings that would have entailed factual inquiries of a kind
which lower courts regularly engage in under other statutes and in
136 See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MAT-
TER OF INTERPRETATION 28 (1997).
137 The rule holds that any ambiguities in a criminal statute must be resolved in
favor of the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009); United
States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987);
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-49 (1971).
138 See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
139 See, e.g., Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766-68 (1985).
140 See supra Part I.B.2.
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other areas of the law. Such use of the principle is a little disconcert-
ing, as courts-particularly lower courts-are supposed to be fact-find-
ers. Indeed, if the factual inquiries necessitated by a particular
construction are clearly laid out, and the litigants do their job in mar-
shaling evidence, then it seems very much within the judiciary's pre-
scribed role to make the necessary factual determinations. No one
said judging was supposed to be a cakewalk.
Indeed, the Court's readiness to dismiss plausible statutory con-
structions based on the presumed difficulty that lower courts will have
in implementing them smacks a bit ofjudicial abdication. This is par-
ticularly so when the Court's opinion makes no effort to balance the
benefits of messiness avoidance against the countervailing costs that
result from its rejection of a particular construction. If the Court were
to come out and state, for example, that "We think the administrative
efficiency of our preferred construction is worth the tradeoff in
reduced litigation fees that prevailing parties will be able to recover,
or outweighs the possibility that some refugees who might otherwise
have been eligible for asylum now will be categorically barred," then
at least it would be openly discussing the consequences of its messi-
ness avoidance, instead of simply announcing such avoidance as an
unqualified necessity. There are thus two problems with the Court's
current use of the practical difficulty form of anti-messiness argument:
First, it is unclear that the benefit the Court obtains through this form
of argument-i.e., avoidance of cumbersome factual determina-
tions-is one that courts should be seeking irrespective of the costs.
Second, and relatedly, the Court's use of this form of argument is
unconstrained by any limiting principles, minimum showings, base-
lines, or obligation to balance countervailing considerations.
C. Circumvention
Another problem with the anti-messiness principle is that fact-
.specific, messy inquiries sometimes may be necessary to respond to
regulatory arbitrage or sophisticated actors who know how to avoid
the most obvious violations of statutory prohibitions. Such actors
might engage in under-the-radar behavior that violates the statute but
that will be discovered only if courts are willing to look beyond the
surface of the statutory prohibition and engage in messy factual
inquiries.' 4
The cases discussed in Part I provide ample illustration. In Pacific
Bell,' 42 for example, the Court's refusal to recognize price-squeezing
141 I thank Deborah Widiss for highlighting this problem.
142 Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009)
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claims under the Sherman Act, based largely on anti-messiness con-
cerns, ignored the possibility that sophisticated companies that know
what they are doing may be able to avoid violating the simple version
of the statute by eschewing typical monopolistic behavior, yet still use
price squeezing to achieve the effect of monopoly power. In fact, the
concurring opinion acknowledged as much, observing that the
"means of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition,
are myriad [and] may involve a 'course of dealing' that, even if profit-
able, indicates a 'willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an
anticompetitive end"' and even explaining that "a 'price squeeze' may
fall within that latter category."143 Similarly, in Bartlett v. Strickland,14 4
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion pointed out that the Court's
refusal to read the VRA to require the creation of plausible crossover
districts made it possible for states deliberately to break up naturally-
occurring crossover districts and to submerge their sizeable black vot-
ing populations into majority-dominated districts, "without ever impli-
cating . . . the VRA."14 5 Likewise, in Gross, the majority's rejection of
the mixed-motive construction of the ADEA ignored the fact that few
employers these days engage in explicit, blatant age discrimination
and that a more complicated implementation test therefore could be
necessary to fulfill the statute's purpose.
Further, even absent sophisticated actors seeking to circumvent a
statute's intended effect, the anti-messiness principle is likely, at least
at times, to run counter to legislative intent. The legislative process
necessarily involves rough accommodation, messiness, and compro-
mise. Ignoring these drafting and enactment process realities and
seeking to impose a simple, pristine statutory meaning at the interpre-
tive stage therefore is a bit unrealistic. Indeed, in at least some cases,
Congress may have intended the messier construction of a statute, or
the messier construction may be more consistent with the statute's
purpose, such that application of the anti-messiness principle would
defeat Congress's intent or purpose. When the anti-messiness princi-
ple and legislative intent or purpose are thus in tension, it is doubtful
that the anti-messiness principle necessarily should prevail every time.
I suggest, in Part II.E below, that there might be good reason to adopt
a presumption that for jurisdictional statutes and cases involving statu-
tory implementation tests, the anti-messiness principle should carry
greater weight, while for the ordinary interpretation of substantive
143 Id. at 458 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
144 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009).
145 Id. at 1259 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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statutory provisions, congressional intent should trump anti-messiness
concerns.
D. Anticipatory Rejection
The above problems are compounded by the fact that the "anti-
messiness" principle often leads the Court anticipatorily to tailor stat-
utes and to reject plausible statutory constructions in order to avoid
harms that are merely speculative. In many cases, the principle is
invoked based on the Court's conclusory anticipation that a particular
interpretation will prove unduly difficult to implement or will require
factual inquiries that implementing courts will be unable to handle,
rather than on any actual experience with implementing the construc-
tion. 14 6 This means that the mere possibility that a construction may
prove complicated to implement is enough to derail it, even if there is
nothing beyond judges' hypotheses or guesses to prove the supposed
messiness.
This speculation problem is similar to one that scholars have
identified with the avoidance canon. Recall that the avoidance canon
instructs courts to avoid statutory interpretations that raise serious
constitutional difficulties. 1 4 7 The canon has been criticized for giving
judges wide rein to jettison plausible statutory constructions based on
vague suppositions that a construction may come into tension with the
Constitution.148 Commentators have noted the amorphous manner
146 Such conclusory anticipation was at work, for example, in Allen, Holder, Bartlett,
Pacific Bell, Negusie, Richlin, and Kawasaki, discussed above. See supra Part I.B.1-3.
Other cases, not discussed in Part I.B., in which the Court invoked the anti-messiness
principle to anticipatorily reject a statutory construction include Conkright v. From-
mert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1649 (2010) (adopting a deferential standard of review for
ERISA Plan Administrator's interpretation of company's retirement plan on remand
after Administrator's first interpretation was rejected by the court as unreasonable,
citing, inter alia, anti-messiness concerns including inexpertness); Anza v. Ideal Steel
Co., 547 U.S. 451, 458-59 (2006) (applying practical difficulty form of anti-messiness
argument to reject application of RICO based on a business competitor's tax fraud);
City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 566-67 (1992) (relying, inter alia, on practi-
cal difficulty form of anti-messiness argument to conclude that fee-shifting statutes do
not permit contingency enhancement of a fee award beyond the lodestar amount).
147 See supra Part I.B.1 & n.25.
148 See, e.g., Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts: The Supreme
Court's Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1,
88-90 (1996) (criticizing the canon because it "allows courts to alter drastically the
legislation to protect phantom constitutional norms without ever stating that the Con-
stitution demands the statute's rewriting"); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited,
1995 Sup. CT. REV. 71, 83 (1995); see also HENRY V. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 211-12
(1967) (worrying that use of the canon would become one of "evisceration and tergi-
versation"); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTs 285 (1985); Harry H. Welling-
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in which the Court invokes the avoidance canon, relying on it without
concluding that the rejected construction necessarily would violate
the Constitution.14 9 In the avoidance context, critics worry about such
vague, inchoate declarations of constitutional difficulty because the
costs of applying the canon can be so great. That is, because the
canon enables judges to rewrite clear statutory text in the name of
avoiding alleged constitutional difficulties, scholars cry foul when the
alleged difficulties seem overstated or insufficiently pressing. The
anticipatory speculation problem in the anti-messiness context is
slightly different, stemming not so much from a fear that the statutory
text will be flouted without good reason,150 but from the danger that
the statute's intent or purpose will be undermined based on specula-
tive concerns.
Some have argued that the avoidance canon should be invoked
only in cases where the Court has engaged the constitutional issue
and clearly determined that the rejected interpretation in fact would
violate the Constitution.15 1 One potential solution to the anticipatory
rejection problem in the anti-messiness context would be to impose a
similar limitation on application of the anti-messiness principle. For
example, we might formulate the anti-messiness principle as follows:
when a statute is susceptible to two or more plausible interpretations,
and it is highly probable, (not merely possible) that one of the construc-
tions will prove (or has proved) unduly burdensome or impossible for courts
to implement, courts should choose the construction that avoids such
undue burdens or impossibilities.
E. Jurisdictional v. Substantive Inquiries
The anti-messiness principle, as defined in this paper, is inher-
ently concerned with judicial administration. All of the forms of anti-
messiness arguments described in Part I.B are framed in terms of the
difficulty that courts will have in implementing and administering a
particular statutory construction. And the benefits gained through
ton, Machinists v. Street: Statutory Interpretation and the Avoidance of Constitutional Issues,
1961 SUP. CT. REv. 49, 67-71 (1961).
149 See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance
Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren
Court, 93 CALIF. L. REv. 397, 400 (2005) (noting common criticism that the canon
"allows a court, on the vague ground that a serious constitutional question exists, to
rewrite statutes without clear limits on the revising role and without a clear demon-
stration that the Constitution compels rejecting the most natural interpretation of the
law"); Kloppenberg, supra note 148, at 88-90.
150 See infra Part III.B.
151 See, e.g., FRIENDLY, supra note 148, at 211-12; Schauer, supra note 148.
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messiness avoidance-clarity, predictability, more efficient decision-
making-are of the kind that enhance the judicial administration of
statutes.1 52 This focus suggests that reliance on the anti-messiness
principle may be most justified, and perhaps least problematic, in con-
struing jurisdictional statutes and addressing jurisdiction-related statu-
tory questions. Jurisdictional statutes, after all, are designed to define
the parameters of legal authority and to organize the administration
of the law. Moreover, jurisdictional statutes typically deal with thresh-
old questions, which must be answered before a court can get to the
substantive issues that underlie the case. Messiness in the implemen-
tation ofjurisdictional statutes thus can clog up the entire judicial sys-
tem, leading to delays and confusion that interfere with the
implementation of other statutes. Thus, the values served by the anti-
messiness principle correspond to the purposes underlying jurisdic-
tional statutes.
Perhaps for this reason, the Court's use of anti-messiness argu-
ments has proved less controversial in cases involving jurisdictional
statutes than it has in cases involving substantive, nonjurisdictional
statutes. Of the cases discussed in Part I.B that involved jurisdictional
statutes, many were decided unanimously; others were decided by
wide margins even if not unanimously.153 By contrast, cases discussed
in Part I.B that involved substantive statutes were much more closely
contested, with nearly two-thirds resulting in 5-4, 5-3, or plurality
decisions.154
152 See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1186 (2010) (explaining "the
need for judicial administration of a jurisdictional statute to remain as simple as
possible").
153 Id. at 1181 (reaching a unanimous decision); Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank,
Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (reaching a 5-3-0 decision that was 5-1-2 on messiness);
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp., 130 S. Ct. 2433, 2447 (2010) (reach-
ing a 6-3 decision); Allen v. Siebert, 522 U.S. 3, 7 (2007) (reaching a 7-2 decision);
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988) (reaching a
unanimous decision); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970)
(same); Swift v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965) (6-3). But see Roell v. Withrow, 538
U.S. 580 (2003) (reaching a 5-4 decision).
154 Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640 (2010) (reaching a 5-3 decision); Bart-
lett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009) (reaching a 5-4 decision); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v.
Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009) (reaching a 5-4 decision); Altria Grp.
v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2009) (reaching a 5-4 decision); Gross v. FBL Financial Servs.,
129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009) (reaching a 5-4 decision); Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511
(2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (reaching a 6-2-3 decision); Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v.
Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571 (2008) (reaching a 7-2-0 decision); Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply
Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 466-68 (2006) (reaching a 7-2 decision) (invoking anti-messiness
arguments to reject application of RICO to competitor's tax fraud; not discussed); Bd.
of Cty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (reaching a 5-4 deci-
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Further, the problems discussed in this Part seem amplified in
the context of statutes involving substantive rights or prohibitions,
because clarity and predictability are not the paramount concerns
motivating such statutes and because messy compromises are particu-
larly common in legislation that creates or protects substantive rights.
In other words, tension is more likely to exist between anti-messiness
concerns and a statute's underlying objectives when dealing with sub-
stantive statutes than with jurisdictional ones-because policy com-
promise, rather than judicial administration, is at the forefront of the
legislature's thinking when drafting substantive statutes. Looseness,
for example, is particularly problematic in the context of substantive
statutes because it permits judges to interfere with the political com-
promises and policy judgments that underlie a statute in the name of
an undefined simplicity norm. Because there are no established crite-
ria for determining how much messiness should be fatal to a construc-
tion, let alone how messiness concerns should be balanted against
other interpretive tools, intensely debated substantive statutory rights
and prohibitions can be curtailed or expanded in an ad hoc manner
by courts at the implementation stage, with little attention to the legis-
lature's intent or purpose.
Judicial shirking of complex factual inquiries that courts are com-
petent to handle also seems more problematic in the context of sub-
stantive, versus jurisdictional, statutes. If a court concludes that it is
not worth expending extra judicial resources to engage in detailed
factual inquiries to determine the threshold issue of which court can
hear a particular claim, that seems less troubling-and less dismissive
of congressional intent or individual rights-than when a court con-
cludes that it is not worth expending extra judicial resources to deter-
mine whether a particular kind of voting or employment
discrimination has been shown, or a particular kind of economic
injury demonstrated. There is a difference between relying on anti-
messiness concerns to decide the forum in which a litigant's claims
will be heard versus to decide whether the litigants' rights are cogniza-
ble at all.
In addition, other interpretive rules and presumptions may be
implicated in the context of substantive statutes that are not relevant
in the construction of jurisdictional statutes-and these rules and pre-
sumptions may push in the opposite direction from anti-messiness
concerns. Consider, for example, the interpretive rule that remedial
sion); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994) (reaching a 3-3-4 plurality decision); City of
Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992) (reaching a 6-3 decision).
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statutes are to be construed liberally155 (ignored in Gross'56 and Bart-
letti57), the rule that ambiguities in statutes involving Indian rights
should be construed in the Indians' favor,s58 the rule of lenity,15 9 the
rule that antitrust statutes are to be liberally construed' 60 (ignored in
Pacific Bell), or the rule that tax exemptions should be narrowly con-
strued.' 6 ' Such competing subject-matter-based considerations are
more likely to surface in the interpretation of substantive statutes than
in the interpretation ofjurisdictional statutes, which are procedural in
scope. To the extent that such subject-matter-based considerations
point towards a statutory construction that might prove messy to
implement, they caution in favor of greater prudence and balance in
judicial application of anti-messiness arguments, particularly given the
looseness, anticipatory rejection, and other problems identified
above.
These differences between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional
statutes suggest that perhaps courts should apply the anti-messiness
principle differently depending on the type of statute being inter-
preted. One possibility is to restrict the application of the anti-messi-
ness principle to jurisdictional statutes, on the theory that the values
served by the principle are more relevant, or more closely aligned,
with the goals of such statutes. A second option might be to weigh the
anti-messiness principle more heavily when applied to jurisdictional
statutes, but to consider it a weaker concern-and perhaps one that
ranks behind legislative intent and statutory purpose-when applied
to substantive statutes.
III. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
Although the use of anti-messiness arguments has gone unno-
ticed in the statutory interpretation literature, the principle reflects
155 See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562
(1987); United States v. An Article of Drug . .. Bacto-Unidisk... , 394 U.S. 784, 798
(1969); Piedmont & N. Ry. Co. v. ICC, 286 U.S. 299, 311 (1932).
156 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
157 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009).
158 See, e.g., Cty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992); Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S.
759, 766-68 (1985); Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918).
159 See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009); Arthur Andersen LLP v.
United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005); Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000).
160 See, e.g., Federal Mar. Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973);
Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 395 U.S. 642, 646-47 (1969); United States
v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 316 (1956).
161 See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring);
United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 357 (1988).
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jurisprudential concerns that are both intuitive and familiar. This
Part seeks to situate the anti-messiness principle within theories of
jurisprudence and statutory interpretation, identifying its theoretical
corollaries as well as its points of dissonance from leading contempo-
rary approaches. Section A discusses theoretical connections between
the anti-messiness principle and general jurisprudential theories,
including minimalism162 and the rules versus standards paradigm.
Chiefly, I conclude that while the anti-messiness principle has much in
common with these rule-bound jurisprudential and interpretive
approaches, it is less focused on eliminating judicial discretion than
are such theories and does not go as far in limiting judicial balancing
as these rule-bound theories would advocate. Section B explores the




Although messiness avoidance may seem at first to reflect a mini-
malist approach to judging, on closer inspection it is a distinctly maxi-
malist,1 63  rule-bound approach. Indeed, anti-messiness is
conceptually opposed to the particularistic, incremental decisionmak-
ing that minimalism champions. Minimalism advocates case-by-case
adjudication and narrow decisionmaking on grounds that do not
overstep the bounds of the instant case.1 64 Minimalism aims not to
achieve clear, certain legal rules but to avoid, or minimize, the risk of
error that accompanies broad, categorical pronouncements.' 55
Minimalism thus would oppose the anti-messiness principle's
rejection of statutory constructions that require fact-specific inquiries
162 Minimalism has been theorized most prominently by Cass Sunstein. See, e.g.,
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A
TIME]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES 27-30 (2005) [hereinafter SuNsrmIN,
RADICALS IN ROBES]; Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REv. 353
(2006) [hereinafter Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism]; Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme
Court, 1995 Term-Foreward: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1996)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided].
163 I use the term as Sunstein defines it, to refer to "those who seek to decide cases
in a way that sets broad rules for the future" and who believe that "firm, clear rules,
laid down in advance, are the best way" of ensuring predictability and of constraining
judges. See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 162, at 9; Cass R. Sunstein,
Minimalism at War, 2004 Sup. CT. REv. 47, 49 (2004).
164 See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 162, at 11; Sunstein, Leaving
Things Undecided, supra note 162, at 90-92.
165 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 162, at 4, 47, 49; SUNSTEIN,
RADICALS IN ROBES, supra note 162, at 27-29.
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and evaluations by implementing courts. It would accept the risk of
potential error in the application of a statute to individual cases in
exchange for the reduced risk of categorical error that could result
from an absolutist construction that misses the mark.16 6 Further, in
contrast to the Court's application of the anti-messiness principle in
cases like Bartlett, Holder v. Hall, Gross, and Negusie, minimalism would
be especially committed to nuance and particularism where the statu-
tory issue was highly controversial. 16 7
Maximalism, by contrast, aspires to broad, clear, general rules.16 8
It is conceptually opposed to particularism and unpredictability. 169
Maximalism would applaud the anti-messiness principle's rejection of
statutory constructions that leave significant work to be performed by
implementing courts, particularly where that work involves case-by-
case evaluations and judicial discretion. It would second the anti-
messiness principle's work in replacing unwieldy, unworkable statu-
tory implementation tests with simpler, more predictable ones. Fur-
ther, maximalism, like the anti-messiness principle, would trade the
possibility of inequitable or inaccurate results in a particular case for
greater systemic clarity and efficiency. 170
But despite the theoretical consonance between the anti-messi-
ness principle and maximalism, the anti-messiness principle often
does not go as far as maximalism would advocate. This is because
there is some mismatch between the focus (bite noire) of the anti-mess-
iness principle and that of judicial maximalism. While the anti-messi-
ness principle abhors and seeks to avoid layered, disorderly,
complicated, time-consuming judicial fact-finding in statutory imple-
mentation, judicial maximalism abhors and seeks to minimize particu-
larism and judicial discretion. 7 1 These two sets of concerns often
overlap, but they are not identical.
166 See, e.g., Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, supra note 162, at 363-64; Sunstein,
Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 162, at 18.
167 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 162, at 5-6 (discussing
virtues of minimalist decisionmaking when confronted with controversial issues on
which the nation is divided).
168 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 162, at 9-11; Tara Leigh
Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 28 (2009);
Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 162, at 15.
169 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 162, at 210.
170 Cf id. at 11 (describing how maximalist Justices Scalia and Thomas push the
Court to provide wide judgments and clear guidance).
171 See, e.g., id. at 210 (describing maximalist Justice Scalia's distrust of particular-
ism and focus on limiting judicial discretion); Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided,
supra note 162, at 15 n.48 (noting Justice Scalia's maximalist "effort to prevent highly
particularistic, case-by-case judgments").
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To illustrate, consider again the Court's opinions in Holder v.
Hall. As we saw, the Holder plurality opinion invoked indeterminacy-
based anti-messiness arguments to conclude that vote dilution claims
based on the size of a governing body could not be brought under the
VRA, because of the lack of an available benchmark for comparison.
Justice Thomas's maximalist concurring opinion, joined by Justice
Scalia, agreed with this construction, but would have gone much fur-
ther to overrule a landmark VRA precedent, Thornburg v. Gingles,172
which articulated the governing multi-factored "totality of the circum-
stances" test for establishing "vote dilution" claims.173 Justice
Thomas's opinion expressed great concern over the extraordinary
power and discretion that courts exercise under Gingles's reading of
the VRA and sought categorically to eliminate vote dilution claims in
order to remedy this perceived evil.174 In other words, the anti-messi-
ness-based plurality opinion focused on the factual determination that
the proffered construction would require courts to make; whereas the
maximalist concurring opinion focused on the judicial discretion pro-
duced by the Court's overarching test for implementing the VRA.
Moreover, anti-messiness concerns stopped well short of where max-
imalism would have liked to push the law-refusing to eliminate all
judicial discretion in favor of a firm, clear legal directive.
2. Rules v. Standards
The anti-messiness principle also has obvious theoretical parallels
to the rules versus standards paradigm. That paradigm sets bright-line
rules against flexible standards; a classic example is the choice
between a rule that no one may drive over sixty-five miles per hour
versus a standard that no one may drive at an excessive speed. Rules
are absolute and straightforward, while standards are somewhat open
ended and require further judicial evaluation in the implementation.
Rules are predictable, clear, and categorical; standards require case-
by-case analysis. Sunstein, who views the rules versus standards para-
digm as a subset of minimalism, notes that rules operate as a "full or
nearly full before-the-fact specification of legal outcomes." 75 Stan-
dards, by contrast, "leave[ ] a great deal of work to be done at the
moment of application."176 With rules, costs are incurred ex ante, in
172 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
173 Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 944 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
174 See id. at 913 (arguing that the current construction of the VRA treats the judi-
ciary like "Platonic guardians" or a "centralized politburo").
175 See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 162, at 41.
176 Id.
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the setting of the legal imperative. Once a rule has been established,
decisionmaking should be relatively rote. With standards, costs are
incurred in the case-specific application.
The anti-messiness principle obviously has much in common with
the rules side of this paradigm. It too is concerned with predictability
and clarity. And it too seeks to avoid complicated, uncertain judicial
analysis in the implementation of statutes. As with judicial maximal-
ism, however, the anti-messiness principle differs in important ways
from the jurisprudential preference for rules over standards. First,
courts do not use the anti-messiness principle to establish clear before-
the-fact specification of legal outcomes; they use it either as a "plus
factor" to aid in determining the meaning of statutory words and
phrases or as a reason for adopting easy-to-administer statutory imple-
mentation tests. In other words, the anti-messiness principle is con-
cerned with simplifying the administration and implementation of
statutes, not with laying down firm legal directives or eliminating case-
by-case analysis.
Second, and related to the first, the anti-messiness principle
sometimes is invoked to reject a messy, complicating construction
without embracing a clear rule in its place. That is, unlike the rules
versus standards paradigm, the anti-messiness principle does not nec-
essarily involve a choice between a multi-factor test and a clear, simple
one. Rather, invocation of the principle often results only in the
refusal to apply a statute in a manner that will lead to complicated
factual inquiries in the implementation. 17 Think again of Holder v.
Hall, or Bartlett v. Strickland, in which the Court refused to interpret
Section 2 of the VRA to create a cause of action based on the size of a
governmental body or to require the creation of crossover districts,
respectively, but in no way simplified the multi-factored, discretion-
filled Gingles test for determining whether a voting discrimination
claim has been proved.178 The reason for this discrepancy is, again,
that the anti-messiness principle is far more focused on preventing
courts from engaging in intricate factual inquiries than it is on avoid-
ing judicial balancing tests, the exercise ofjudicial discretion, or even
177 See, e.g., Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp., 130 S. Ct. 2433, 2447
(2010) (rejecting application of Carmack Amendment to inland portion of shipments
originating overseas; no bright line rule adopted); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline
Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009) (refusing to recognize price-squeezing claims
under Sherman Act; leaving intact two-factor standard for evaluating price discrimina-
tion claims); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994) (rejecting application of VRA sec-
tion 2 to size of governmental body but leaving intact standard-filled "totality of the
circumstances" test for determining whether voting discrimination exists).
178 See Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009); Holder, 512 U.S. at 874.
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case-by-case analysis. The rules approach, by contrast, is highly con-
cerned with the subjectivity of flexible standards and the discretion
that such standards give implementing judges to import their own val-
ues into the decisionmaking process.179 For example, a strict rule-
bound approach would have little patience for the open-ended, stan-
dard-filled predatory pricing test applied by the Court in Pacific Bell;
yet the Pacific Bell opinion applied that test without criticism, invoking
anti-messiness arguments only to note that the rejected statutory read-
ing would have required lower courts to monitor prices in both whole-
sale and retail markets and evaluate appropriate pricing levels-
neither of which courts are qualified to do (a judicial inexpertness
argument).180
In short, the anti-messiness principle is a less extreme decisional
principle than either judicial maximalism or a rules-based approach
to judging. In part, this may be because it operates as a background
norm, rather than as an active, affirmative decisionmaking theory.
But mostly, I think it is because anti-messiness is an implementation-
focused concept concerned with the effects that particular statutory
interpretations will have on the future administration of statutes,
rather than an overarching philosophical approach that seeks to con-
strain judicial discretion.
B. Theories of Statutory Interpretation
Like any background norm or interpretive tool, the anti-messi-
ness principle carries implications for statutory interpretation theory.
This Part evaluates the principle in light of several prominent contem-
porary statutory interpretation theories. I conclude that the principle
not only is a natural fit with textualism, but has the potential to aug-
ment that theoretical approach. Conversely, the anti-messiness princi-
ple is methodologically in tension with purposivism, and seems to
have less appeal to purposivist than to textualistjudges. Last, the anti-
messiness principle is an example of pragmatic reasoning in practice,
but one that may fail to live up to pragmatism's ideal vision of careful
judicial balancing.
1. Textualism
Textualism is a formalist method of statutory interpretation that
seeks answers from the official language of the statute and rejectsjudi-
179 See, e.g., Overton, supra note 17, at 73-75; Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards,
33 UCLA L. REv. 379, 400 (1985).
180 See Pac. Bell Tel. Co., 555 U.S. at 457.
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cial inquiry into legislative history, intent, and statutory purpose.18 1 It
prizes clarity and predictability, both in the content of statutes and in
the methodology used to interpret them. It is a rule-bound method,
which aims to reduce the costs of decisionmaking so that the burden
on courts and others of determining a statute's meaning is low.18 2 In
this sense, there is a natural consonance between textualism and the
anti-messiness principle, which also serves, by eliminating difficult or
uncertain judicial inquiries, to streamline statutory decisionmaking
and to promote predictability.
Several common values seem to underlie both textualism and the
anti-messiness principle. At the most basic level, both privilege sim-
plicity and finiteness. Textualism aims to identify the plain meaning
of a statute-i.e., the simple, basic, obvious meaning.'83 It is founded
on a belief that most statutes have an easily identifiable meaning, and
there is some evidence that textualist judges tend to find a plain
meaning more often when interpreting statutes than do other
judges.' 84 Textualism also presumes that there is a correct, definitive
answer to every interpretive question. It treats the interpretive process
like a puzzle;' 85 if the answer cannot be found through a plain read-
ing of the text, then the dictionary, the statute's structure, and the
Court's prior interpretations of the same word or phrase in other stat-
181 See, e.g., SCAUA, supra note 136, at 25 (" [O1f course it's formalistic! The rule of
law is about form.").
182 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 162, at 218.
183 See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DIcrIONARY 1087 (2d Collegiate ed. 1982) (list-
ing the third meaning for the word "plain" as "clearly understood; evident; obvious"
and the sixth meaning as "not complicated; simple").
184 See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation Pro-
Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking Is Better than judicial Literalism,
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 1233, 1266, 1275 & n.235 (1996) (noting that textualists
believe they seldom need to defer to agency interpretations because they usually find
clear meaning in the text); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpreta-
tions of Law, 1989 DuKE L.J. 511, 521 (1989) (calling himself "[o]ne who finds more
often ... that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relation-
ship with other laws"); see also Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the
Roberts Court's First Era: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 250
tbl.2 (2010) (reporting empirical data showing higher rates of reference to plain
meaning/text by textualist judges than by other judges during first three-and-a-half
terms of the Roberts Court).
185 See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 354, 372 (1994) (describing how textualists' puzzle-solving
approach often results in answers); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New
Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 749, 779 (1995) (characterizing textualist interpretive process as anal-
ogous to solving a puzzle); see also Mank, supra note 184, at 1257 (noting textualists'
conviction and certainty about their method).
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utes should be consulted to decipher the statute's meaning. Such
bounded interpretive aids are trusted to lead the Court to the correct
construction. The anti-messiness principle likewise proceeds from a
presumption that statutory interpretation should be simple and
straightforward, and seeks to achieve these goals by guiding the Court
to avoid overly complex, cumbersome constructions and implementa-
tion tests. Further, the principle also seeks to impose finiteness on the
interpretive process, rejecting statutory constructions that would force
courts to engage in indeterminate, impossible, or overly confusing fac-
tual assessments to decide a statute's meaning.
On a more fundamental level, both textualism and the anti-messi-
ness principle are motivated, in part, by a separation of powers, or
institutional competence, concern with avoiding judicial lawmaking.
Textualist judges and scholars regularly express concern about the
judiciary's ability accurately to evaluate legislative intent and history or
to identify a statute's true purpose, and argue that interpretive
approaches that depend on such inquiries lend themselves far too
readily to judicial lawmaking based on ajudge's own sense of what the
statute should mean.186 Many of the Court's anti-messiness arguments
similarly emphasize the judiciary's limitations as an Article III, rather
than an Article I, actor-pointing out that judges lack the skills,
authority, or capacity to make certain kinds of factual determinations
and suggesting, between the lines, that it is inappropriate to delegate
such determinations to them. This is most obvious with respect to the
judicial inexpertness form of anti-messiness argument, but also true of
the indeterminacy and the practical difficulty based anti-messiness
arguments.1 8 7
186 See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 136, at 17-18 ("The practical threat is that, under
the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, com-
mon-law judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires, extending their
lawmaking proclivities from the common law to the statutory field."); ADIUAN
VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 89-117 (2006) (providing a deep analysis of
how and why courts are institutionally prone to misreading legislative history and
arguing that the better interpretive solution is deference to administrative agency
interpretations); Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits ofJudicial Compe-
tence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1837-38 (1998)
(arguing that Court's incompetence in evaluating legislative history in Holy Trinity
should serve as a warning of judicial ineptness in using legislative history to interpret
statutes generally).
187 In Bartlett, for example, the Court clearly evinced a concern about the institu-
tional inappropriateness of judges making "political judgments" determining how
much crossover voting potential a district must possess in order to qualify for VRA
protection; likewise, in Pacific Bell, the Court openly criticized the rejected statutory
construction as one that would require judges to make economic policy judgments
about when a company's terms of dealing had crossed the line into price squeezing.
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Second, and related to the first, both textualism and the anti-
messiness principle seem to reflect, on some level, a concern about
excessive regulatory oversight. As Table 1 in Appendix A illustrates,
judicial rates of reliance on the anti-messiness principle display a
noticeable partisan divide, with anti-government/anti-regulation
jurists more likely to embrace anti-messiness arguments and New
Deal-favoring jurists more likely to reject such arguments. 18 Moreo-
ver, the Court often has invoked the anti-messiness principle to reject
statutory readings that would require judicial policing of a regulated
industry.189 Textualism similarly tends to appeal to anti-government
jurists and to be disfavored by New Deal-supporting jurists. Part of
the reason for its appeal to anti-government jurists is that textualism
can operate as a nondelegation doctrine of sorts.190 Indeed, as Justice
Scalia has noted, textualism is useful for defeating the sort of statutory
ambiguity that gives agencies room to expand their regulatory author-
See Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1245 (2009); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline
Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 440 (2009).
188 See infra Appendix A.
189 The Court's opinion in Pacific Bell, for example, decried the regulatory role
that judges would be forced to play if it adopted a statutory construction recognizing
price-squeezing claims under the Sherman Antitrust Act. Specifically, the Court
observed that the price-squeezing construction would require judges "to act as central
planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing" as well as
"to police both the wholesale and retail prices to ensure that rival firms are not being
squeezed." Pac. Bell Tel. Co., 555 U.S. at 452-53 (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Such price monitoring, the Court worried, effectively would put judges in
the position of "assum[ing] the day-to-day controls characteristic of a regulatory
agency." Id. at 453.
Similarly, in Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451 (2006), an anti-messiness
case not discussed in Part I above, the Court had to decide whether the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) encompassed a cause of action by
a business owner alleging that a competitor injured his business by failing to charge
sales tax on its cash sales and using the windfall to reduce its prices. See id. at 455-56.
The business owner argued that the competitor had submitted fraudulent state tax
returns to conceal its tax fraud, and that the filing of these fraudulent returns consti-
tuted mail and wire fraud-both forms of "racketeering activity." A majority of the
Court rejected this reading, arguing that proximate cause under the relevant statutory
section requires "some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious
conduct alleged." Id. at 457. The majority justified the direct relation requirement
itself by noting "the difficulty that can arise when a court attempts to ascertain the
damages caused by some remote action" and warned that the RICO construction it
rejected would have required courts to engage in complex market evaluations and
make judgments about what portion of an injured firm's lost sales were the result of a
competitor's price decrease, and what portion of the competitor's price decrease was
attributable to the competitor's racketeering activity. See id. at 458-59.
190 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron 's Mistake, 58 DuKE L.J. 549, 611 (2009).
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ity.19' Notably, very few anti-messiness cases involve agency interpreta-
tions. I think this is because, in a sense, the anti-messiness principle
checks lower courts' discretion to determine statutory meaning in
application in much the same way that textualism checks administra-
tive agencies' power to dictate how a statute will be implemented.
In practice, the cases discussed in Part I.B reveal that the syner-
gies between textualism and the anti-messiness principle tend to play
out in unexpected ways. That is, the Court tends to invoke anti-messi-
ness arguments when the statutory text at issue is ambiguous, to help
it determine whether a particular application falls within the statute's
scope or to aid it in articulating a test for implementing the ambigu-
ous word or phrase. This is not to suggest that the Court does not
make anti-messiness and textual arguments alongside each other in
some cases-it does-but the Court seems most inclined to invoke the
anti-messiness arguments precisely when the text does not provide
clear, definitive answers.192 In other words, the Court seems to use
the anti-messiness principle almost to augment, or supplement, textu-
alism. What I mean by this is that the Court often employs anti-messi-
ness arguments to achieve a relatively clear, simple statutory meaning
even when the text lacks a plain meaning.193 This makes sense
because even when the statutory text cannot provide a clear and
straightforward answer, the anti-messiness principle can-given the
theoretical consonance described above-serve as a backup interpre-
tive rule that steers the Court towards a clear and straightforward
interpretation of the statute, and away from muddled, open-ended
interpretations. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Negusie illus-
trates this backup potential well; although most of the justices con-
cluded that the text of the INA's persecutor bar was ambiguous on the
voluntariness point,194 justice Scalia was able, through anti-messiness
191 See Scalia, supra note 184, at 521.
192 See, e.g., Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp., 130 S. Ct. 2433, 2447
(2010); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010); Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S.
511, 525 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring); Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (2003);
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 880 (1994).
193 See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009) (no crossover district
requirement under the VRA); Pac. Bell Tel. Co., 555 U.S. at 438 (no price squeezing
claims under the Sherman Act); Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571, 580
(2008) (expenses and costs associated with paralegals' fees are to be recovered at the
"prevailing market rate" for such fees).
194 Six of the nine justices agreed that the statutory text was ambiguous as to the
applicability of the persecutor bar to persons who had been coerced into persecuting
others in their home country. Justices Stevens and Breyer disagreed, arguing that the
statute clearly contained an exception for coerced conduct; and Justice Thomas con-
versely argued that the statute unambiguously barred all persecutors, irrespective of
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(and policy) arguments, to advocate for a clean, straightforward, and
predictable reading of the provision. 1 5 The Hertz opinion also is illus-
trative: The plain meaning of the diversity jurisdiction statute's "prin-
cipal place of business" language quite plausibly could be the place
where a corporation's business activities take place; but it equally plau-
sibly could be the place where the corporation's headquarters are
located. Yet through application of the anti-messiness principle, the
Court unanimously was able to resolve this textual ambiguity in favor
of the simple, easy-to-administer headquarters reading of the statute.
Textualism has not yet acknowledged the assistance that it some-
times can receive from the anti-messiness principle. This is not terri-
bly surprising, since the anti-messiness principle has, until now,
operated in the background of the Court's interpretive practice.
Indeed, given the ad hoc and doctrinally unstructured nature of the
Court's anti-messiness arguments, textualists may not even be con-
sciously aware of the subtle pull that this background norm has been
exerting-or of the potential that it has to help them achieve their
interpretive goals in cases where traditional textualist tools might fall
short. Textualism thus could have much to gain from acknowledging
the anti-messiness principle and from this Article's efforts to define
and describe the principle's use.
2. Purposivism
Purposivism is an interpretive approach associated with the Legal
Process movement. 196 In contrast to textualism, it advocates that
jurists interpret the words of a statute by identifying the statute's pur-
pose and then seeking the meaning that best fits with, or fulfills, that
purpose. 197 Purposivism almost necessarily is inexact-because divin-
ing a statute's purpose often involves guesswork and inferences, as
does choosing the interpretation that will best carry out that purpose.
Purposivism thus is likely to prove a messier approach, method-
ologically, than is textualism. It involves guesswork, judicial discre-
tion, and potentially deep judicial inquiries into legislative history and
other sources that might illuminate a statute's objectives. In this
sense, it invites judicial determinations that are not unlike the messy
the voluntariness or involuntariness of their conduct. See Negusie, 555 U.S. at 528
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 538 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
195 Id. at 525 (Scalia, J., concurring).
196 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and
Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. Pirr. L. REV. 691, 693 (1987).
197 See HENRY M. HART, JR.& ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1374 (William
N. Eskridge,Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
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factual inquiries rejected under the anti-messiness principle. Given
purposivism's virtual embrace of messy methods to achieve its inter-
pretive goals, messiness avoidance hardly seems a high priority for this
interpretive approach. In fact, the anti-messiness principle's focus on
clarity, predictability, and administrative efficiency seems to be in
direct tension with purposivism's open-ended inquiry into a statute's
motivating principles and its invitation to judicial speculation about
the implications that such motivating principles have for the statute's
meaning. Accordingly, one might expect purposivists to be less
averse, jurisprudentially, to messiness-producing statutory interpreta-
tions than their textualist counterparts and correspondingly less
inclined towards use of the anti-messiness principle to interpret
statutes.
At the same time, however, purposivism is not substantively in ten-
sion with the anti-messiness principle. That is, purposivism's substan-
tive focus on a statute's underlying objectives could well lead to a
statutory construction that is straightforward and simple to adminis-
ter. This was the case, for example, with some of the jurisdictional
statutes discussed in Part I. Some statutes' purposes may readily be
achieved through clean, uncomplicated constructions; others may
require more nuanced interpretations to reach their full effect. If this
is the case, then we should expect purposivist judges to embrace the
messier construction in some cases and to reject it in others, as dic-
tated by the particular statutory purpose at issue.
In practice, this halfway approach is in fact what we see. On the
one hand, the theoretical dissonance between the anti-messiness prin-
ciple and purposivism bears out to some extent. As Table 1 below
shows, those Justices considered to be most purposivist in their
approach to interpreting statutes-Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Gins-
burg-also have voted to adopt messy statutory constructions more
frequently than have their textualist colleagues. The Court's most tex-
tualist judges, by contrast, have embraced anti-messiness arguments in
nearly every case studied in this Article. On the other hand, those
jurists most committed to purposivism have, in a handful of cases,
invoked or joined opinions that invoke anti-messiness arguments.198
198 See infra Table 1.
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At times, purposivists seem to appreciate the tension between
their interpretive approach and anti-messiness arguments-though
the appreciation remains vague.199 Again, this is not surprising, given
that the anti-messiness principle thus far has operated as an unde-
fined background principle. In bringing the principle to light, this
Article presents both a challenge and an opportunity for purposivism.
The challenge lies in accounting for the anti-messiness principle's
appeal to even the most ardent purposivists in at least some of the
Court's statutory cases. As Table 1 shows, even those jurists most com-
mitted to purposivism have invoked or joined opinions that invoke
anti-messiness arguments in a handful of cases. 200 Further, a few of
these cases involved situations in which the statute's purpose arguably
was undermined by the messiness-avoiding construction. 201 While a
few anomalous cases hardly defeat purposivism's claim to authority,
both the data and the theory raise important questions for
purposivists regarding the costs and limits of purpose-based analysis.
Purposivism could benefit from acknowledging the messiness some-
times inherent in purposive interpretation and either defining some
limits on how far jurists should go in identifying and fulfilling a stat-
ute's purpose or, conversely, mounting a robust defense of messiness
in statutory interpretation. The former approach might involve draw-
ing a line between jurisdictional and substantive statutes, as this Arti-
199 See, e.g., supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
200 See supra Table 1.
201 See supra Table 1. In Anza v. Ideal Steel, for example, Justices Ginsburg, Souter,
Breyer, and Stevens invoked or joined an opinion invoking anti-messiness arguments
to interpret plaintiffs cause of action as falling outside of civil RICO's ambit, against
Justice Thomas's argument that doing so undermined RICO's statutory purpose of
"eliminat[ion] of the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate
organizations operating in interstate commerce." See Anza v. Ideal Steel, 547 U.S. 451,
459-60, 474 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
S. REP. No. 91-617, at 76 (1969)). Justice Breyer's part-concurring, part-dissenting
opinion explained this ruling as necessary to minimize the conflict between the pur-
pose of RICO and the purpose of the antitrust laws, which also were implicated in the
case-but the other Justices did not address the statute's purpose at all. See id. at
485-86 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Compare City of Bur-
lington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 566 (1992) (Souter, J., joining opinion that refer-
enced anti-messiness arguments, among others, to conclude that fee-shifting statute at
issue did not permit a contingency enhancement), with id. at 568-69 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (citing Senate Reports to argue that majority's construction would under-
mine statute's purpose of enabling plaintiffs without resources to hire good attor-
neys). See also Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 588-89 (2003) (referencing statute's
purpose in adopting messier construction); id. at 595-96 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(Stevens, J., joining in the dissenting opinion, invoking inconsistency form of anti-
messiness argument to advocate adoption of a black-and-white explicit consent rule).
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cle has suggested, 202 on the theory that anti-messiness concerns
deserve greater weight in the construction of statutes designed to
organize the judicial system than in other contexts. Or it might
involve requiring that courts identify some basis in the statutory text
or legislative history before they can allow statutory purpose to trump
serious anti-messiness concerns. Conversely, purposivists might
invoke the circumvention argument raised earlier in this Article203 or
provide other reasons why messiness avoidance never should be
allowed to trump purpose-filling statutory constructions. Irrespective
of how precisely purposivists respond to the practice of messiness
avoidance, jurists and scholars alike stand to learn much from the
conversation.
3. Pragmatism
Also referred to as public-values-based theories of statutory inter-
pretation, pragmatic theories focus on the practical consequences and
policy effects that an interpretation will have on society. One promi-
nent pragmatist, Judge Richard Posner, has argued that the object of
statutory interpretation should be to produce the best results for soci-
ety, and that courts should seek to identify the best result through
practical reasoning based on "facts and consequences rather than on
conceptualisms and generalities." 2 0 4 Other pragmatists take slightly
different approaches; Bill Eskridge, for example, argues that statutory
interpreters should weigh multiple values and interpretive tools to
arrive at the best reading and that statutes should be interpreted
dynamically, to reflect their present societal, political, and legal con-
texts.205 And Cass Sunstein has suggested a series of specific interpre-
tive rules that courts should employ to ensure that outcomes in
statutory cases reflect particular constitutional and normative princi-
ples. 206 Pragmatism lacks a clear or uniform methodology, but its vari-
202 See supra Part II.E.
203 See supra Part II.C.
204 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 73-74 (First Harvard
University Press 1990); see RicHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL & LEGAL
THEORY 227 (1999).
205 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L.
REv. 1479 (1987); William N. Eskridge,Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20, 46 (1988) ("[S]tatutes ought to
be responsive to today's world. They ought to be made to fit, as best they can, into the
current legal landscape.").
206 See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REV
405, 462-505 (1989).
2012) 1517
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ous strands are united-and distinguishable from textualism and
purposivism-in their open emphasis on outcomes and practical con-
sequences and their frank recognition that statutory interpretation
involves a fair amount of creative policymaking by judges.
Pragmatism necessarily leaves significant discretion to judges to
ascertain the best result under the circumstances of the case. Pragma-
tism does envision some checks upon judicial discretion-calling on
judges to consider the systemic as well as the particular consequences
of their decisions and to give due regard to institutional values such as
impartiality and predictability. 207 In addition, pragmatists expect
judges to pay attention to traditional interpretive sources such as stat-
utory text and legislative history, along with the practical conse-
quences of their constructions. 208
The anti-messiness principle occupies an interesting space within
pragmatism. On the one hand, it is a distinctly practical background
norm, focusing on the difficulty, impossibility, indeterminacy, or
inconsistency produced as a consequence of particular statutory con-
structions. On the other hand, the anti-messiness principle elevates
one kind of practical consequence, and one public value-administra-
tive efficiency-above all others. Traditional pragmatism, by contrast,
balances many different consequences in determining the best statu-
tory construction, including the current needs or values of society,
equitable considerations, the statute's goals, and common sense, in
addition to administrative concerns. 209 So while pragmatists would
not object to the Court's reliance on anti-messiness concerns in inter-
preting statutes, they would, I think, prefer to see the principle
invoked in conjunction with other practical considerations, and bal-
anced against them-rather than treated as the sole, or most impor-
tant practical consequence worth considering.
In other words, although the anti-messiness principle is itself a
pragmatic, practical consequence-based interpretive tool, it is not one
that bears any methodological consonance with pragmatism as an
interpretive theory. On the contrary, the anti-messiness principle is
207 See RicHARD A. POSNER, LAw, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRAcy 61 (2003).
208 See, e.g., RIcHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 253 (2008) (insisting that
pragmatic judges usually do, and should, follow texts and precedents); Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 205, at 382, 384 (describing legislative history, precedent, rea-
soned commentary, and text as "constraining factors" that limit judicial discretion).
209 See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 205, at 46; Eskridge, supra note 205, at 1479;
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 205, at 359 ("[S]tatutory interpretation will consider




efficiency-promoting and inquiry-limiting, whereas pragmatism is
expansive and prioritizes judicial balancing over efficiency.
There may, however, be another way of understanding the anti-
messiness principle's role within pragmatism. Elsewhere, I have
argued that there is a distinct divide between the form of practical
consequences to which different jurists give weight when interpreting
statutes, and that this divide reflects a larger jurisprudential divide
over the kind of coherence that different jurists prioritize in statutory
interpretation. 210 Jurists who preference "legal landscape" coherence,
for example, consider the primary goal of statutory interpretation to
be to find the meaning that is most consistent with-and effects the
least disruption in-the existing legal framework relating to the stat-
ute at issue. 211 By contrast, jurists who preference "statute-specific"
coherence aim to ensure that the specific policy embodied in the indi-
vidual statute is sensibly and consistently applied, both internally and
over time.212 This jurisprudential divide seems to translate into the
following practical consequences divide: Legal landscape-coherence
jurists seem to focus on administrability-type practical reasoning about
how a particular interpretation will affect the legal system-e.g.,
whether it will waste judicial resources, whether it will prove impossi-
ble or burdensome to administer, and whether it will result in unclear
or unpredictable rules.213 Statute-specific coherence jurists, con-
versely, tend to focus on policy-constancy-type consequences, such as
ensuring that the statute at issue is applied consistently over time and
across like situations, that it is applied in a just manner, and that it is
not given an interpretation that renders it meaningless or
nonsensical. 214
The anti-messiness principle is a classic "administrability-type"
concern, emphasizing clarity, predictability, and minimal disruption
of the legal system. Thus, it makes sense that the principle would
appeal significantly to landscape-coherence-preferring justices like
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas.21" Further, the fact that certain
jurists tend to reference the anti-messiness principle more frequently
than do others, combined with the practical consequences divide
described above, suggests that pragmatism may require some tweaking
as a theory. That is, pragmatism's grand vision of judges balancing
and weighing multiple competing values may need to be modified to
210 See Krishnakumar, supra note 184, at 221.
211 Id. at 225.
212 Id. at 226.
213 Id. at 226, 244-45.
214 Id. at 227, 245-46.
215 See supra Table 1.
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take into account the practical reality that not all jurists view all practi-
cal consequences equally, and that different jurists tend to emphasize
different kinds of practical concerns over others when engaging in
pragmatic reasoning. What precisely this means for pragmatism is
unclear-it could mean merely that pragmatism needs to acknowl-
edge its susceptibility to this particular form of judicial policy-prefer-
ence-based decision making. Or it could mean that pragmatism needs
to specify, at least broadly, the kinds of practical concerns that jurists
should weigh against one another when engaging in practical reason-
ing. Either way, the anti-messiness principle's widespread appeal both
corroborates pragmatism's descriptive value and suggests that the
interpretive approach operates a little less perfectly in practice than
the theoretical ideal would have it.
CONCLUSION
The anti-messiness principle has played an undeniable and some-
times prominent role in many of the Supreme Court's statutory inter-
pretation cases. Despite its prevalence as a background norm,
however, the principle has gone unnoticed and unexamined until
now. This Article has defined anti-messiness, categorized its most
common forms, highlighted its potential dangers, and explored its fit
with and implications for the most prominent statutory interpretation
theories. It has suggested that the anti-messiness principle's appeal
may depend, in part, on the jurisprudential philosophy of the jurist
contemplating its application in a particular case, and that at least two
of the leading statutory interpretation theories might benefit from
expanding to account for the manner in which the principle is used.
Throughout, this Article's primary aim has been to illuminate-so
that lawyers, judges, and scholars can appreciate and evaluate the
work that the anti-messiness principle performs in the Court's statu-
tory interpretations.
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